

# IDENTITY ON THE LINE

A HISTORICAL-CULTURAL STUDY OF THE  
INDONESIAN-STATE IDEOLOGY OF PANCASILA

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF  
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTERS OF ART  
IN THE DEPARTMENT OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF  
CAPE TOWN

PRESENTED BY ABDUL KADIR RIYADI

UCT  
1999

The University of Cape Town has been given  
the right to reproduce this thesis in whole  
or in part. Copyright is held by the author.

The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No quotation from it or information derived from it is to be published without full acknowledgement of the source. The thesis is to be used for private study or non-commercial research purposes only.

Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author.

Contents.....	i
Acknowledgement.....	ii
Abstract.....	iii
Introduction .....	iv
Methodology.....	vii

## Part One

### Search for a Common Identity

I. History .....	2
Introduction .....	2
Religions and Colonialism in Indonesia .....	3
The Embryo of Social Systems .....	7
II. Social Systems in Action .....	17
Introduction .....	17
<i>Priyayi</i> and the Norms of Bureaucratic Populism .....	19
a. Budi Utomo .....	19
b. Taman Siswa .....	22
<i>Santri</i> and the Norms of Islamic Salvationism-Universalism.....	30
a. Islamic Salvationism .....	30
b. Muhammadiyah: Puritan Islamism .....	33
c. NU: Islamic Traditionalism .....	35
Revolutionary <i>Abanganism</i> .....	40
III. Sukarno and the Institutionalisation of Norms .....	42

## Part Two

### Pancasila as a Cultural System

Introduction .....	53
I. Pancasila as Evaluative System .....	55
II. Pancasila as Symbolic System .....	69
III. Anti-Pancasila Movements .....	76
IV. Ritualisation of Pancasila .....	81
Conclusion .....	91
Bibliography .....	96

## **Acknowledgement**

I wish to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Assoc. Prof. Ebrahim Moosa for his direction and encouragement, and also for his intellectual and financial support.

I am also thankful to my teacher, Assoc. Prof. Abdul Kader Tayob, for his sincere intellectual inputs during my study at the University of Cape Town. Also to my fellow post-graduate students at the Department of Religious Studies, especially Taher Sitoto and Somaya Abdallah for their discussions and contributions.

In addition, I wish to express my appreciation to the staff of the Indonesian Consulate in Cape Town, for their financial assistance.

Abdul Kadir Riyadi  
Cape Town, 20 December 1998

## **Abstract**

Pancasila, literally meaning “Five Principles”, is the philosophical basis on which the modern Republic of Indonesia was established. It was devised in order to fulfil the goals and ends of independence. One such goal is the establishment of religious harmony and tolerance in national life.

The aims of this thesis are, in the first place, to explore the importance of such a system as Pancasila, and to provide emphatic interpretation of Pancasila which in essence discloses the dynamics of religious interaction in Indonesia.

This thesis is divided into two parts. The first part is dealing with the historical context out of which Pancasila was found. Here, it is ultimately concerned with the question of the genealogy of Pancasila. It is also dealing with the question of how Sukarno -the first Indonesian president and the father of Pancasila- laid its foundation. The second part is mainly concerned with the questions of, what the elements of Pancasila are, and through what mechanism Pancasila is maintained. Thus, while the first part is historical, the second is cultural, and examines Pancasila from the cultural point of view.

Pancasila as a cultural system will be dealt with from two angles, namely Pancasila as an evaluative system, and Pancasila as a symbolic system.

## **Introduction**

On 21 May 1998, Soeharto announced his dramatic resignation from power as President of the Republic of Indonesia. The world responded with shock. Indonesian people; students, activists, religious leaders, school teachers, all celebrated his downfall with joy and happiness. They expressed their freedom after being oppressed under his authoritarian rule for more than three decades.

That Soeharto was an authoritarian ruler is very much true. For the sake of power, Soeharto had sacrificed the lives of thousands of his own people. East Timor is a clear example. Recently in Aceh, a province with a predominantly Muslim population- an independent human rights group found that an estimated 3000 people had lost their lives during military operations. The government accused the Acehnese of being anti-Soeharto.

His 32 year rule was characterised by corruption, collusion and nepotism. He personified both authoritarian as well as paternalistic leadership. In terms of the economy for example, Soeharto's leadership was only associated with predatory business dealings of his own family and associates. It has been reported that at least 120 companies among the suppliers and contractors of the Pertamina (the Indonesia's state oil and gas company) were owned by the Soeharto family and friends. They also enjoyed a monopoly on all imports of oil and its products worth billions of US dollars in 1996, and controlled its distribution. It is estimated that one of Soeharto's small family oil-trading alone, netted about 30 million British Sterling profit in 1997.

There are about 1 247 separate, active companies in which the Soeharto family members had significant shares.

Behind them are *yayasans*, charitable foundations. These were key vehicles for Soeharto's financial interests which were never audited during his 32 years in power. It is likely that one *yayasan* could profit him hundreds of millions of pounds per year.

Now that he has resigned, people want him to be brought to justice. Much condemnation and denunciation has been pronounced by the people. This thesis is somehow, a way of criticising Soeharto. Through the study of Pancasila -the state's ideology- I express my symphatetic attitude toward Pancasila, and my antipathetic disposition towards Soeharto.

This thesis is divided into two parts. The first part consists of three chapters. The first chapter discusses the "Religions of Indonesia". Chapter two, explores exclusively the development of Islam and the influences of Hinduism and Buddhism on Islam. In this chapter Muslims are divided into three groups, one of which is puritan, while the others are not. Chapter three tackles the question of how Sukarno - the first president and the father of Pancasila- *evaluated* and institutionalised the various existing "religious" norms and founded Pancasila.

Part two consists of four chapters. The first chapter deals with the notion of Pancasila as an evaluative system. One of the key issues in this chapter focuses on the notion of God within Pancasila. I place the God of Pancasila as a "God of religious tolerance" rather than the God of metaphysical order. The second chapter discusses the notion of Pancasila as a symbolic system. The third, explores the anti-Pancasila movements, while the last chapter is concerned with the process of the ritualisation of Pancasila.

## Methodology

There are three major theoretical components that underlie this thesis. The first is Talcott Parsons's theory of action (Parsons 1951, 4-5). The second is Clifford Geertz's concepts of symbolic systems (Geertz, 1966), as well as his conception of three religiously-oriented systems in Indonesia, namely the *santri*, the *priyayi* and the *abangan* (Geertz, 1969). The third is Robert Bellah's theory of religion in general and his model of American Civil Religion in particular (Bellah, 1970). This notion of American Civil Religion is understood as an institutionalisation of religious norms and will be used to explain the process of how the norms of the three religious systems in Indonesia are institutionalised in the system of value and symbol of Pancasila. However, we are not concerned about whether Pancasila is to be called Civil Religion or not, for the exact application of the term civil religion is debatable. We are rather more concerned with the problem of Pancasila being a form of an institutionalisation of norms.

Because the understanding of the term "institutionalisation" is so broad, let me use -for the purpose of this study- Samuel Huntington's definition of institutionalisation. He defined it as "a process by which organisation and procedures acquire value and stability" (Huntington 1968, 12-24).

On the other hand, the central hypothesis that underlies this thesis is that whatever norms and symbols, or loyalties and commitments people may have when institutionalised, they are likely to be expressed religiously. It is here and in this sense that we will locate Pancasila. Pancasila is expressed religiously and thus



elevated to the level of a religious system simply because it institutionalises diverse religious norms and facilitates the interaction of religiously diverse people.

The three components mentioned above form the major framework for analysis in this work. In the Parsonian theory of action human behaviour occurs in all human action. The elaboration of human behaviour in the formation of systems made up of human actions occurs in three configurations. First, the orientation of action of any one which is called the personality, and defined as the organised system of the orientation or motivation of action of one individual actor. Second is the social system, namely the action of plurality as a process of interaction, which is made up of the relationships of individuals, and organised around the problems inherent in or arising from social interaction of a plurality. Third is a system of culture which can be distinguished into three major classes of culture patterns, viz. 1) System of ideas or beliefs, 2) System of expressive symbols, and 3) System of value-orientation (Parsons 1951, 6-8). Thus the elements of Parsonian theory are many and are comprehensive but the elements that are considered here to be the most relevant is his theory of social and cultural systems. Here therefore we choose these two theories as analytical tools, and employ them to bring us closer to the heart of our discussion, Pancasila.

The above Parsonian framework will be married with that of Clifford Geertz's and Robert Bellah's. Geertz had introduced the three "religious" systems in Indonesia (all of them refer to Islam), namely *santri*, *priyayi*, and *abangan*. The *abangan* religious system represents a stress on the animistic aspect of religious life; *santri* represent a stress on the Islamic aspect, and *priyayi* represent the Hindu aspect of the religious phenomenon. The behaviour of these three religious systems will be analysed in terms of Parsonian theoretical schema of social system mentioned above. Meanwhile Parsonian theory of cultural systems will be utilised to analyse the

religiously-oriented value system of Pancasila. When we discuss the cultural system of Pancasila, Geertz's conception of symbolic systems will play its important role in order, first and foremost, to avoid the mechanistic character of Parsonian conception.

Bellah's conception of general theory of religion, as such his thesis of "religious" identity will reinforce this theoretical presupposition. He maintained that a conception of identity is particularly necessary in a situation of stress and disturbance, because it can provide the most general set of instruction as to how the system is to maintain itself and repair any damage sustained (Bellah 1970, 11). He also said that through religious symbol man has symbolised to himself his own identity, and the order of existence in terms of which his identity makes sense (Bellah 1970, 195). These two statements are relevant for the purpose of analysis of the cultural system of Pancasila at its two levels: the former is relevant at the level of value system, while the later is relevant at the level of symbolic system.

### *Research Approach*

Thus there are three approaches used in this research. The first approach involves the use of theory of -what Parsons called *orientation of action*. It says that the orientation of action entails selection. Selection is made possible first, by cognitive discriminations; it cognates the object field, discriminating any particular object from others and otherwise assessing its properties. Second, by cathectic orientation; it cathects particular objects through attributing to them significance for direct gratification or deprivation. Third, by the process of evaluation; the process of deciding among alternatives, of assessing them in the light of their ramified consequences (Parsons 1951, 10-11). However the second orientation (cathectic orientation) is omitted, whilst the first orientation (discriminative orientation) will be

employed to explain the discriminative behaviour of the three religious systems. Based on this particular approach, my thesis on these groups is that they all are discriminative in their way of dealing with the problem of what sort of identity the state should be based on. The third orientation (evaluative orientation) will be used to explain the evaluative way of Sukarno (the founder of Pancasila), in dealing with the religious problem and in inventing the system of Pancasila. Inspired by Parsonian *Frame of Reference* (1951, 4-29) I would argue that, in evaluating the alternatives, and finally in inventing Pancasila, Sukarno had indeed invented the cultural system that consists of the system of value and the system of expressive symbol.

The second approach involves a methodological framework adapted from an essay by Clifford Geertz, entitled *Religion in Java: Conflict and Integration*. This essay is published in a book called *Sociology of religion: Selected Readings*, edited by Roland Robertson. As we have said above, Geertz suggested that the Javanese population in particular, are grouped according to their religious beliefs, their ethical preferences and political ideologies into three main cultural types which reflect the moral organisation of each system. This framework introduced by Geertz still provides both qualifying and relevant concepts for the examination of religiously-oriented behaviour of the three systems, and thus they are quite relevant to be used as premises to tackle the problem of Pancasila, particularly when we place Pancasila within a religious discourse. Hence, this framework provides the basis for deriving the three systems whose elements of religious norms, behaviour and -to some extent- symbol, are of crucial significance in the formation of Pancasila's values and symbols.

The third approach involves Robert Bellah's theoretical framework of religion in general and American Civil Religion in particular. Two elements of American Civil Religion are relevant for the discussion of Pancasila; the question of God and the

place of ceremonial events. If Bellah argued that God in the civil religion of America is more related to law, order and right, in Pancasila, I would argue that God is more related to the religious tolerance rather than to the God of metaphysical order. As far as the question of ceremonial events is concerned, -following Bellah again- I would consider the existing ceremonial events as a form of ritual that was designed to sustain the persistence of Pancasila.

### *Concept of Common Identity*

At the core of this thesis is the conception of a common identity. In this term, we argue that the persistent domination of say, santri Islam as an exclusive identity promotes religious conflict that emerges particularly from individuals of non-santri community. In this sense, the concept of a common identity is a system of interaction of a plurality of persons. It is also historically understood as a system of how one particular group or system interacts and responds to another groups or systems. In our case, the response and interaction between the existing systems is always antagonistic. The common identity (Pancasila) is therefore placed as a process of *evaluation* or *selection* among the alternatives of an antagonistic system in an effort to end the antagonism. So far, selection/evaluation is seen as Sukarno's sole action, but this process of selection cannot be random in a social system.

With regard to the content of Pancasila, this thesis upholds that one of the most important functional imperatives of the maintenance of social systems is that the value-orientations of the different systems must be integrated in some measure in a common system and symbol. To some extent, all on-going three religious systems do actually show a tendency toward a general system of common cultural orientations, but they remain restricted to their spatial proximity, or remain to -what Marion J Levy

called- a neighbourhood unit. The invention of Pancasila which contains core values of the three systems as well as an expressive symbol of the Garuda Pancasila is especially crucial in this process of evaluation for they are very dominant determinants of stability in the country.

The three systems -santri, priyayi, and abangan- are viewed here as the source of conflicting norms, as the base of conflicting expectancy patterns, and as the source of differing reference groups. Using Clifford Geertz's word, they are viewed as (religious) primordial attachments (Geertz, 1963); something that stems from the "givens" of religious existence: the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community whose congruity of religion is seen to have an ineffable, coerciveness in and of itself.

The three systems are also used as working models for the derivation of value orientations, and their religious behaviour are fully stated as the Animistically, Hinduistically, and Islamically oriented. Each of these terms refer to a predominating form of a particular culture. The three systems represent particular religious and cultural predisposition which serve as a cognitive (discriminative) sources as well as moral commitments for the members of each system.

### *Concrete Foci of Analysis*

Certain concrete religious educational institutions of santri, priyayi and abangan were given an examination in the light of the process of a search for the national common identity. By exploring the educational institutions we also aim at explaining how do the three religious systems work. Behind the terms santri, abangan and priyayi is a notion of social action as a complex of cultural and social systems but categorised in terms of relevance to religious behaviour. Two hypotheses underline this religious

behaviour. First, in examining religious behaviour of the three systems or some aspects of it, basic religious conflicts are readily observable. This point is crucial, for it will contribute to our understanding of general religious behaviour in Indonesia over time. The second hypothesis derives from the argument that (1) the condition of religious pluralism prevents any one religion from being used by all people as a source of generalised meaning, but (2) people nevertheless need to invest their activity with meaning, especially when that activity brings together persons of diverse religious background. Therefore (3) a substitute meaning system is needed. Pancasila is placed here as that substitute meaning system.

Finally, it has to be said that all social analysis regardless of whether or not it deals specifically with religious structures, has common ground insofar as some aspect of human action is its purview. In this study we discard a “purely religious” element, to get a better understanding of the substantive aspects of the development of religious life and symbols in Indonesia.

# PART ONE

# **Part One**

## **Search for a Common Identity**

### **I. History**

#### **Introduction**

One of the most remarkable feature of Indonesia is its social and cultural diversity. Its culture does not constitute one homogeneous unity. It is an extraordinarily diverse country in its ecology, economy, demography, society and culture. Spread over Indonesia's 17,000 islands are some 300 ethnic groups distinguished by religion, name, language, custom, ecology and social organisation. These range from the fiercely Acehnese on the northern tip of Sumatra, the Javanese, the communities of Flores and Timor, to the Balinese and the tribes of the interior of Kalimantan and New Guinea. More recent immigrant communities are Chinese, Indian Gujaratis and Arab Yamanis.

The Javanese are the dominant ethnic group. They represent over a third of, Indonesia's population. However, culturally and geographically they distinguish amongst themselves on the basis of subtle differences in language, culture and region.

Most importantly, and apart from natural, geographic and ethnic diversity, religious differences between the various world religions viz. Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism and Christianity are other factors that contribute to the diversity. Among these religions, Islam is the dominant.



However, given that the Javanese on the racial level, and Islam on the religious level are dominant, this thesis will concentrate more on Islam and on the Javanese. In other words, it will focus on Islam in Java.

### **Religions and Colonialism in Indonesia**<sup>1</sup>

There are four recognised religions in Indonesia; namely Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism and Christianity (Roman Catholic as well as Protestant). Among these religions, Hinduism and Buddhism are the oldest. The first Indian Buddhists arrived in Indonesia between the first and the second centuries AD. They brought with them Buddhism in its two sects, Hinayana and Mahayana. The latter became more advanced in the 8th century AD. Many well-organised kingdoms with a high degree of civilisation were ruled by indigenous kings who had adopted the Hindu or Buddhist religion. This period is called the period of the Hindu Kingdom and lasted till the 16th century AD.

Among the early Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms were the first century kingdoms of Kudungga in the northern part of the country and Kutai on the island of Borneo. Kutai was ruled by the Hindu kings Devawarman, Aswawarman and Mulawarman.

Around 502 AD there was a Buddhist kingdom called Sriwijaya on the island of Sumatra in the town of present Palembang. It was ruled by king Gautama Subhadra and later by his son Pyrawarman. This kingdom had diplomatic relations with the south Indian kingdom of Nalanda. The Sriwijaya built a school on its premises where Indians could learn the art of moulding bronze statues and broaden

---

<sup>1</sup> This chapter is based on *Indonesia 1996: An Official Book*, editor-in-Chief Kosky Zakaria.

their knowledge of Buddhist philosophy. With the spread of Buddhism, Sriwijaya's influence reached out to many other parts of the archipelago.

Another well-known Buddhist kingdom was Cailendra in Central Java. It was ruled by the kings of the Cailendra Dynasty. During their rule (750-850 AD) the famous Buddhist temple, Borobudur, in Central Java was built.

One of the Pallawa language-stone inscriptions of 732 AD mentions the name of king Sanjaya who was later identified as the king of Mataram, a kingdom that replaced Cailendra in Central Java. In West Java there were the kingdoms of Galuh, Kanoman, Kuningan and Pajajaran.

At the end of the 10th century (911-1007 AD) the powerful kingdom of Singosari emerged in East Java under king Dharmawangsa. He codified laws and translated into Javanese the famous "Mahabrata" epic. He also ordered the translation of the Hindu holy book, the Bhagavat Gita.

At the end of the 13th century the kingdom of Sriwijaya in Sumatra began to fall as a result of frequent attacks by the south Indian kingdom of Chola and by the East Javanese kingdom of Majapahit. Majapahit itself was a Buddhist-Hindu kingdom. It became the only Hindu-Buddhist empire in the history of Indonesia that successfully united almost the whole archipelago. It was under king Hayam Wuruk that Majapahit became so powerful. Majapahit declined and collapsed in 1520.

Indian culture and customs were introduced during this Hindu period, such as the system of monarchical government, the ancestral system, the organisation of the military, the promotion of arts through literature, music and dance, architecture, and most importantly the religious practices and rituals.

Following the collapse of Majapahit, Hinduism and Buddhism consequently declined and Islam started to flourish. Islam came to the archipelago as early as the seventh century. It took firm root during and after the thirteenth century and soon acquired followers by virtue of its egalitarian philosophy. Muslims city states sprang up from Aceh in the western part of the country to the spice island of Maluku in the eastern part. Most of the early Muslims came from Gujarat and Persia. Along with trade they propagated Islam. The first Hindu king to be converted into Islam was the sultan of Demak, Sultan Raden Patah. This Muslim Sultan spread Islam westwards to Cirebon and Banten and eastward along the northern coast of Java to the kingdom of Gresik. Sultan Raden Patah also brought the downfall of the powerful kingdom of Majapahit (1293-1520).

Islam spread further east to where the sultanates of Bone and Goa in Sulawesi were established. Also under the influence of Islam were the sultanates of Ternate and Tidore in Maluku. North of Java, Islam spread to Banjarmasin in Borneo and further west to Sumatra. The island of Lombok, eastern Bali, was also converted to Islam later. Thus, up to the 16th century Islam was the only undisturbed power until the coming of Portuguese and Dutch colonialism.

The Portuguese arrived in Indonesia in 1511 after their conquest of the Islamic kingdom of Malacca on the Malaysian Peninsula. They propagated Christianity and were successful in Minahasa, Maluku and East Timor.

Meanwhile, the Dutch had started their quest for Indonesian spices. They established the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in 1602. After the nationalisation of the VOC in 1799 the Dutch government had a firm grip on the vital territories of the country. People in these territories were forced to surrender their agricultural

produce to the Dutch merchants. It was the beginning of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia which lasted for 350 years.

The Dutch introduced a policy of ruthless exploitation called "Divide and Rule". They also secured the trade monopoly all over the country. To reinforce their monopoly in the Moluccas particularly, they undertook their notorious Hongi expeditions whereby they burnt down the clove gardens of the local people in an effort to eliminate production.

Realising the danger of the Dutch, the Muslims declared the resistance against the colonial rule. Sultan Agung Hanyokrokusumo of Mataram sent his troops in 1629 to attack the Dutch but they were repulsed. Sultan Hasanuddin of Goa waged a war in 1666 and was also defeated. Prince Trunojoyo of Madura also fought and got killed in 1680.

In 1814 the British came to Indonesia and built Fort York in Bengkulu on the west coast of Sumatra. During the Napoleonic wars in Europe when Holland was occupied by France, Indonesia fell under the rule of the British East India Company (1811-1816). Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles was the most well-known English Governor in Java. After the fall of Napoleon and the end of the French occupation of Holland, the British and Dutch signed a convention in London on 13 August 1814 in which it was agreed that Dutch colonial possessions dating from 1803 onwards should be returned to the Dutch administration in Batavia, now known as Jakarta. Soon the Dutch intensified their colonial rule and sparked widespread revolts. Pattimura, a prince from the island of Sulawesi staged a revolt in the Moluccas (1816-1818). Prince Diponegoro of Mataram led the Java war from 1825 until 1830. Tuanku Imam

Bonjol led the Padri war in West Sumatra while Teuku Umar headed the Aceh war in North Sumatra (1873-1903). King Sisingamangaraja of the Bataks revolted in 1907.

Between 1908 until 1930 many nationalist movements began to emerge in order to have a more organised struggle against Dutch colonialism. Budi Utomo (literally means “Noble Conduct”) was founded on 20 May 1908. In 1912 Sarekat Dagang Islam (The Islamic Trade Union) was established. In the same year Muhammadiyah, an Islamic oriented socio-religious movement was also founded. In December, still the same year Partai Indonesia (The Indonesian Party) was born. In 1926 another Islamic movement called the Nahdatul Ulama’ was established. In July 1927 Sukarno formed the *Partai Nasional Indonesia*, Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI). This party adopted a militant policy of non co-operation with the Dutch as the result of a fundamental conflict of interest between Indonesian nationalism and Dutch colonialism.

In short, within two-decades the Indonesians under the leadership of Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta finally declared independence on 17 August 1945. Sukarno became the first president and Hatta became the first vice president.

### **The Embryo of Social Systems**

In independent Indonesia, Islam is the official creed of the overwhelming majority of the population. But while Islam is the religion of the majority the effects of colonial rule were evident in its divisive and disruptive effects. The Dutch strengthened certain elements of Indonesian society and ignored the others. The Christians and the nominal Muslims for example, became servants of Dutch colonialism. They were given administrative powers and skills. The Dutch also created or encouraged the

growth of new elements like the Chinese middle men while destroying the non-Chinese (Legge 1980, 12). The resultant amalgam was a society that in many respects lacked natural cohesion. This in turn imposed on Muslims in particular an acute problem of political authority for independent Indonesia. If called on to focus on one point among the various issues of post-independence politics, one would say that the task of creating a state and holding together disparate elements were among the most challenging. There was also a need to maintain the connection between the groups that composed the modern elite and the mass of ordinary people and most importantly, between differing religious traditions among Muslims.

The task of holding together the differing Muslim religious traditions was however difficult, since the Muslims were not in the same boat. Besides having been divided by the Dutch, Indonesian Muslims were not all “Qur’anic” or Middle Eastern for example. Indonesian Islam in totality was not a “pure” form of Islam. It was influenced by other religions, particularly Hinduism and Buddhism which resulted in some Muslims being nominal and others religious.

Historically, however, when Islam came in the seventh century and spread widely in the thirteenth century it soon adapted in the course of its existence to the already existing Hindu-Buddhist social and religious structures and served as a support to this existing socio-religious structure. Prior to the sixteenth century Islam was still restricted to the coastal regions of Java and had not been able to penetrate the interior. In the coastal regions it was accepted widely by virtue of its great emphasis on human equality and the value of the individual and spiritual side of life. It was welcomed because of its Qur’anic teaching that emphasised the importance of brotherly love, forbearance, mercy, reasonableness, humility and honesty.

In the latter half of the sixteenth century Islamic influence from the north-east coastal region started to penetrate the Javanese interior region due to the rise of the Islamic state of Pajang (Ricklefs 1993, 40). Islam though, remained superficial in this region because of the influences of Hinduism and Buddhism being extremely strong. So strong were these influences that even until today the religious culture and tradition of this particular region is still very much Hindu-Budhist rather than Islamic.

The fact that the Islamic power in the interior region had not established itself long enough because of the rapidly emerging Hindu state of Mataram and their attack on Pajang, confirmed that the spread of Islam in that region was quite superficial (Koentjaraningrat 1985, 320).

The rise of the secular empire of Mataram during the first half of the seventeenth century and its continuous attempts to harass and undermine the centre of Muslim power, kept Muslim political force under control for the time being. Meanwhile the Javanese in the interior region managed to preserve the essential elements of the traditional Javanese Hindu-Buddhist civilisation. This situation lasted until the second half of the seventeenth century when the political supremacy of Mataram weakened and socio-political instability brought about cultural poverty and an inability to resist the steadily advancing influence of Islam (Legge 1980, 55).

Besides being superficial, Indonesian Islam is also syncretistic. This is to say that unlike the orthodox Middle Eastern Islam, the Islam of Indonesia was a kind of Islam that had picked up many mystical elements in India and Persia in addition to the local animistic traditions. Indeed, the mystical elements of Islam must have facilitated an easy contact between the Muslim missionaries and the local population to whom mystical concepts and ideas were familiar. Thus, the religious system,

culture and traditions in Indonesia had for a long time consisted of an integration of Hindu, Buddhist, Islamic, and to a lesser extent Javanese animistic elements.

A concrete example of that syncretism is the religious ritual of *slametan*.<sup>2</sup> This was originally an Indian religious ritual that merged with the existing Javanese animistic beliefs. The early Muslim missionaries converted this religious practice into an Islamic institution, and become part of Islamic tradition which resulted in Muslims being animated by the autochthonous traditions and beliefs that continue to have a hold on them. Another example is a Muslim educational institution of *pesantren*, the place where the Muslim students learn Islamic knowledge. This institution is originally a Hindu religious and educational institution of *mandala*<sup>3</sup> that successfully converted to an Islamic institution (Wertheim 1956, 200).

Due to the fact that Islam was superficial in some areas and strong in others, and because of Indonesian Islam being very much mystical and syncretistic, three different “religious” variants can be traced in terms of their acceptance of Islam. They all declare to be Muslim but they differ in how they express their Islam. They absorbed the Islamic impulse in different ways. The first variant are the people of the Javanese interior most of whom are of highly Indian-oriented native classes. They are gentry, cultivating an essentially illuminationist approach of the divine, a kind of Far Eastern gnosticism complete with meta-psychic exercises. This variant is better known as *priyayi*, a group of aristocracy which is organised around Hindu hierarchical

---

<sup>2</sup> *Slametan* is a religious ritual commonly held by the Hindu-Buddhist oriented Muslims as well as by the more puritan Muslims. It is often celebrated in anticipation of an event or held in honour of all matters of important occurrences in the life of a family, village or other social unit. The *slametan* is always ceremonial in character and is imbued with a deep religious significance. This institutions however, has no basis in Islam.

<sup>3</sup> *Mandala* is an autonomous estate under ecclesiastical authority, somewhat comparable to the West European medieval monasteries (Wertheim 1959, 284)



doctrine. The second is the peasantry that absorbed Islamic concepts and practices, so far as they understood them, into the folk religion which had absorbed Indian religions, locked in ghosts, gods, jinns, and prophets together into a strikingly contemplative even philosophical manner. They believe in many mystical and animistic elements from the ancient religion of Java, mixed with Hindu and Islamic influences. This variant is called *abangan*. The third variant is the trading class who rely more and more heavily upon puritan Islam and whose members are mostly *hajjis*.<sup>4</sup> They developed a compromise between what flowed into them along the *hajjis* line and what they confronted in Java in order to produce a religious system not quite doctrinal enough to be Middle Eastern and not quite ethereal enough to be South Asian. This variant is called *santri*<sup>5</sup>, the most "superior" Islamic group, organised around a definite doctrine and influenced by the urban orthodox *ulama*<sup>6</sup> (Geertz 1965/1969). The *santris* by virtue of their homogeneous ideals and objectives on the one hand, and their belief in puritan Islam on the other, are opposed to syncretism, mysticism and heterodoxy, the streams that both *abangan* and *priyayi* follow. It is at this point that the basic difference of norms between these three variants become more apparent. In addition, not only did they differ in their basic premises, they also competed with each other to keep their own norm dominant.

These three variants are thus the major contending norms and had been competing with each other for at least four decades before the independence,

---

<sup>4</sup> Hajjis are persons who had performed a pilgrimage to the holy land of Mecca.

<sup>5</sup> The term *santri* originally meant "student" but has come to mean more generally, the serious follower of Islam. The term *abangan* in its Javanese origin means "the red" as opposed to the *putihan*, "white", the devout Muslim or the *santri*. The term *priyayi* literally means an aristocrat.

<sup>6</sup> It should be noticed that this differentiation is very much schematic and should not be accepted uncritically as a descriptive account of the main elements of Javanese society. The three variants should not be too sharply distinguished from one another, and the differentiation is but a rough distinction. One for example, could be *santri* in outlook, but *priyayi* in the way of thinking.

particularly on the issue of national identity. We will therefore, have to study this historical conflict in order to reach the historical invention of Pancasila. This historical conflict however, as far as I am concerned, is the key to understanding of how the Pancasila was finally established.

In the meantime the existence of these various variants has historically exhibited unique resources of cultural development in the country. It has resulted in the country's cultural and religious life never being static and has frequently shown itself to be dynamic. The concrete example of this is the prolonged and unique adaptation of Hindu-Buddhist and Islamic civilisation on the part of the Indonesian peasant society, the spontaneous growth of such Islamic states as Aceh (on the island of Sumatra) and Banten (on the island of Java) as late as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. And finally the unique pattern of cultural change among the Minangkabau on the west coast of Sumatra (Van der Kroef 1954, 83).

When the Dutch came in the seventeenth century they soon introduced the notorious colonial policy called *divide and rule* and thus brought about socio-political problems. Applying its *divide and rule* strategy, its employment policy was to be based on discrimination (Legge 1980, 63). They only employed Christians, Chinese, or nominal Muslims of priyayi and abangan background while refusing to employ santri Muslims. In the educational field, only certain groups of people were allowed to go to Dutch schools. Moreover, the Netherlands East Indies state in Indonesia was a state with autocracy. It was like the aristocratic governments of pre-modern Europe, aloof and unresponsive, stood outside the society it ruled, and acted upon them arbitrarily and unevenly.

By the time Indonesia gained independence in 1945 it was troubled by particular political problems which stemmed from the fact that integration and reconciliation between the privileged priyayi-abangan and the deprived santri became difficult. This is true because the Dutch had left nothing but a legacy of antagonism, frustration, and an embryo of potential conflict due to its *divide and rule* policy. They only contributed to the development of a plural antagonistic structure in Indonesia that caused the cultural and religious dynamism to disappear and be replaced by social discontent and frustration.<sup>7</sup>

The situation after independence was thus characterised by a severe and chronic form which happened because of the composition of religious primordialism created by the Dutch and which prevented any form of mechanism of mediation from being dynamic.

The task of the new government after independence was therefore to get rid of any legacy left by the Dutch and most importantly to create a political frame by which antagonism between various groups and individuals could be domesticated. A political frame that in essence represented the interests of all citizens and clothed in a kind of cultural and symbolic garb devoid of any specific racial or religious orientation. Thus, the new Indonesian state was challenged to not only transfer the sovereignty from a colonial regime to an independent Indonesia, or to merely shift the power from foreign hands to native one's, but also to transform the whole pattern of political life. As such, the challenge was to transform the power from the divisive regime of Dutch colonialism to an integrative new government.

---

<sup>7</sup> The Dutch priest Joseph Grubb, in his very recent speech in Toronto admitted this. See <http://www.republika.co.id>. 20-8-1998, *WNI China di Kanada Minta Maaf Kepada Indonesia*.

During the period of contemplation to transform the country, Sukarno (d. 1970) emerged and the cultural-religious dynamism was partly brought to life. Sukarno was the one that brought about a progressive extension of the sense of primordial similarity and difference generated from the direct encounter of culturally diverse groups in “local” contexts to more broadly defined groups of a similar sort of interacting within the framework of the entire national society. In addition, it was because of Sukarno that the major socio-political as well as religious groups in Indonesia including the three social systems came together to be involved in the national search for a common identity.

Soon some new definitions of the country and a move into new age and national vocabulary arrived with novel ideas of organisations emerging and more sophisticated definitions of the so-called Indonesian identity evolving. The Javanese represented the more active community in this development. They were involved in the new form of religious, social and political leadership. However, this process of transformation took a severe and chronic form simply because of the great extent to which the peoples’ sense of self remained bound up in the gross actualities of blood, race, language, locality, tradition, norm and most importantly “religion”.

Until this point, the problem of searching for a national identity had revolved around the question of what sort of value would occupy national life. Or put differently, what value and whose value would best be the basis for the state as the common identity? Is it that of the santri, priyayi or abangan?

An observer might have expected that Indonesia, a nation with a powerful santri, would experience a resurgence of santri “Islamic” cultural policies. Such expectation is not always correct. The santri’s idealism above all is not accepted by

all citizens including the priyayi and abangan. In addition, the santri had no adequate cultural model of its own. An originator of purely santri Islamic culture is also hardly available, for Indonesian civilisation, despite the fact that the vast majority of its population are Muslims, is itself an amalgam of well-known imports; Buddhism/Hinduism, local Javanese beliefs, Islam and to some extent Animism. Indonesia is not altogether santri-oriented. There is for example, no purely Islamic religious culture. The culture is rather characterised by a highly syncretistic religious life combining elements of Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam. Some of the Javanese santri Muslims do not even follow the fundamentals of Islam or the *ruk'n* of Islam seriously. They do not for example, perform the five daily *salah* regularly although they do spend a great deal of their time on Islam politically or socially. They do firmly believe in Allah, but they also believe in a great deal of other religious concepts and perform many religious ceremonies which have little connection with the official religious doctrines of pure Islam. To some extent thus, the santri is identical to the priyayi and abangan. The santri also sometimes appear to manifest and represent an extensive complex of mystically inclined Hindu-Buddhist beliefs and concepts, as well as syncretistic elements of Islam. Doctrinally speaking indeed, the santris are more puritan than the other two. They are more closer to the formal dogma of Islam. They advocate the most puritan form of Islam.

The question is, if not santri "Islam" then what is the ideal common national identity? What sort of cultural elements are to be worn by all citizens as the common core of decency in national life? These are the questions that we are trying to answer in the following paragraphs.

In fact, the three major traditions of santri, priyayi and abangan represented the whole process of the historic adventure toward the finding of the common national identity. Intrinsically, they were never united in their views as to what kind of common values are appropriate for all Indonesians. Each group adopted their particular point of view and tried to impose it on its counterparts. Consequently, there was a continuous tension between the social systems as to how to construct a national community based on a shared identity, and deconstruct a socially or religiously local identity.

However, a satisfactory understanding of the reasons for this constant tensions demands a circumstantial tracing of the stages through which their relationship to one another passed. And it is in the history of each tradition that such tracing is most readily to be accomplished. The religious, social, cultural and educational or simply *ad hoc* experiments that characterise each tradition, represent among other things a picture of a pattern of the system in which the looming blind clash of primordial and local loyalties evolved.

Once again the three religiously-oriented social systems -which will be so referred to from this point onwards- remain the main religious and cultural paradigm in Indonesia. They constitute a dichotomy between puritan santri Islam versus Javanese syncretism and mysticism. They are established contrasts that remain the main axes of differentiation among the Indonesian religious and even social and political groupings. These three social systems will now be discussed in more detail.

## II. Social Systems in Action

Action must always be thought of as involving a state of tension between two different orders of elements, the normative and the conditional. As a process, action is, in fact, the process of alteration of the conditional elements in the direction of conformity with norms. Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action*, p.732.

### Introduction

The normative component of Parsonian theory of action is of primary significance to our discussion in this particular chapter. Normative orientation signals the point at which the “meaningful” component of action decisively begins to take effect. By the word “meaningful” we refer to any system that consists of two levels; symbolic system and value system. Thus, the conception of a normative orientation is understood here as involving the fundamental concepts of value, symbol, and of culture in general. However, the normative orientation will be treated here as what Parsons called a cultural system, whereas the conditional orientation will be equalised to what Parsons called a social system. The conception of cultural system in this thesis is worn by Pancasila (to be discussed in the subsequent section), and the conception of social systems here are used by the three social systems of santri, priyayi and abangan. The three systems are categorised as social systems simply because they involve a process of interaction between two or more actors. That is to say that in the three social systems the situation toward which the actors are oriented includes other actors. They are also systems whose action is conceived as oriented to goals, namely discriminative goals in this case. Thus, the social systems’ concerns are categorised here into one instead of three modes of orientation<sup>8</sup>, namely cognitive

---

<sup>8</sup> Apparently, in Parsonian theory of action there are three orientations of action. First is cognitive orientation, second is cathectic, and third is evaluative orientation. In this section we only use the first

orientation, which is understood here as a discriminative orientation. The concept of cognition used here therefore denotes a discriminative way of doing things.

The reason for using this conception of cognition, namely discrimination as the key concept for the discussion in this particular chapter is that we need at least one category of motivational orientation to describe the system of action of the three social systems. On the other hand, we have assumed that the motivational orientation of the social systems is cognitive or discriminative in its nature, and that the three are to a significant degree, separate collective entities with their separate identities. They also constitute a distinct society and possess a distinct membership. Thus, they have what Parsons called a distinct “situational conditions” (Parsons 1982, 40); namely being born in a discrete place and environment and living as members of a certain territorial exclusive society and having the capacity to fit into any particular exclusive norm while reluctant to accept any other norms. All these characteristics contribute to the three social systems qualifying as discriminative systems.

In the following paragraph however, I will try to explain inevitably the norms of the three social systems mentioned above, by invoking partly their system of educational institutions. These educational institutions undoubtedly played a crucial important role in expressing and to some extent imposing their particular norms. On the other hand, each group expressed its response to a particular phenomena in a way quite different to the other. The structure of that expression can be traced more easily from their educational system because it is through education -although not education

---

category for the purpose of our analysis. The second is omitted, while the third will be used in the analysis of the next chapter.



alone- that any expressions of any members of any society are defined. It is through education also that the general inculcation and maintenance of norms are carried out.

This section is therefore concerned with the question of what are the norms of the social systems. Here I am careful in using the words norm and value. The word norm will be used for the normative component that is specific to the social systems, while the word value is used for the normative component of Pancasila.

### *Priyayi and the Norms of Bureaucratic Populism*<sup>9</sup>

#### *A. Budi Utomo*

The beginning of the 20th century is a period of initial reflection as to the fundamentals of the common Indonesian national identity. A period where the demand for a consideration of the ideals for the country had emerged. This reflection was in the first place, influenced by a conviction on the part of many Indonesian intellectuals that from a socio-religious point of view Indonesia was in chaos and had been so for a long time. Just as many Indonesians felt that the Dutch colonial regime divided them and gave them no or little opportunity to advance themselves politically, intellectually and economically by being absorbed in the higher echelons of administration, public life, and business, so they have felt that a self-consciousness movement was essential if Indonesia was to ever attain its own national culture and identity.

The problem which immediately arose when self-consciousness movements emerged was precisely that a common national identity was alien to the majority of the Indonesian masses. As such, the problem was that the Indonesians possessed no

---

<sup>9</sup> For more detail and sophisticated discussion on the subject of priyayis, their leaders, varieties, their political ideology, their influences on urban society and so on, see William H. Frederick's *Visions and Heat: The Making of Indonesian Revolution*. pp 34-80.

uniform basis for a common national identity. Nevertheless, they were quite aware that such an identity was needed. They were quite aware also, that in an Indonesian society where social conflicts were of such magnitude, that the absence of any normative force that can play as an identity for all may well be fatal to the future of national life as whole. In such conditions where there was no uniform basis for the establishment of a common identity, and with no stable social framework in which this difficulty could work itself out, the priyayi under the leadership of Wahidin Soedirohoesodo (1857-1917), initiated the attachment of a national self-consciousness movement by establishing an educational institution called Budi Utomo on 20 June 1908 (Zakaria 1995/1996, 33).

This movement belonged to the priyayi as its founders were mainly priyayis. It was initially aimed at improving general education for the common Javanese population and promoting the Javanese culture in general. Subsequently the movement set in motion a nationalistic movement for the political independence of the whole Indonesia (Ricklefs 1993, 164-5).

By establishing Budi Utomo, the priyayi thus become the first group to realise the importance of education, and that education is the key element for advancement. The priyayi group represented a major social and cultural stream in twentieth-century Indonesia.

Like the abangan, the priyayis are Muslims whose adherence to Islam is seldom more than a formal, nominal commitment. They tend to be mystical in their religious ideas, and relatively unconcerned about the demanding ritual obligation of Islam (prayers, fasting, giving alms, etc). Culturally, they are more Hindu-Buddhist in inspiration rather than Muslim and have their origins in the court ideologies

of pre-colonial Java. In the course of the twentieth century these ideologies of pre-colonial Java were linked first to the colonial ideal of bureaucratic service and then to their own ideology of priyayi nationalism. Understandably therefore, the priyayi's norms are a mixture of what I call archaic-Javanism, colonial Western idealism, and local nationalism. These basic norms were traceable particularly when they made efforts to search for the common national identity as the basis for state ideology. They for example, tried to determine and propagate through this educational movement of Budi Utomo any existing features of the past that could be found. They searched the mythological links with pre-civilisation Java, to the times of early historic colonisation by the Hindus and Buddhists, to the times of archaic Java.

Colonial idealism on the other hand, was already part of their norm when in the early twentieth century Western education particularly that of the Dutch, seemed to offer to this upper class a key to a new synthesis which they saw as the basis for a rejuvenation of the national identity.

Nationalism was also part of their norm, discernible when Budi Utomo in the very early stage of its history in 1909 had already decided to adopt a Malay language, subsequently called Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesian Language), instead of Javanese language as the official language. This move of using Bahasa Indonesia as a formal language was soon followed by other organisations after Budi Utomo.

The nationalistic implication of this movement lies among others, in the fact that after 1918 the movement was called Jong Java (Young Java), moving then to become more political than educational. It was involved in organising a series of major political congresses held mainly for the purpose of independence. Jong Java was responsible for some major political commitments like that of the notorious

pledge of the youth, known as the Sumpah Pemuda, in which a joined young students from all over the country pledged that they will remain united as: One country, one nation and one language (Zakaria 1995/1996, 35).

The birthday of Budi Utomo on 20 May 1908 is now celebrated annually as the Day of the National Awakening by the government.

#### B. *Taman Siswa*

Like in Budi Utomo, a positive trend to build a common identity as a national culture by preserving the valuable assets of the past together with the selective adoption of new elements is also to be found in the priyayi's Taman Siswa (Students' Garden) educational movement.

The fact that the movement was trying to preserve the assets of the past only confirmed that it wanted to express their norm of "archaic Javanism", a norm that is culturally and intellectually expressed particularly in the *wayang*<sup>10</sup> performances and literature. The older generation regularly watch the wayang and read and study the traditional moralistic literature and books written in Javanese script that tell the story of the *wayang*. Understandably then, the way of life of the priyayi is largely influenced by the symbolism of wayang and the morals of Javanese literature. Their way of life is also predominated by the classical phrases of wisdom of ancient poets, mystical ideas about the emotional experience of discovering God in one's self, and

---

<sup>10</sup> *Wayang* is a cultural performance that expresses the values of an archaic Javanism, namely the heritage of the Hindu-Buddhist religions. Through it the heritage is expressed and preserved. Most of the wayang stories are based on the old Hindu-Javanese literature and stories such as the *Hikayat Seri Rama* (The story of the Lord Rama, based upon the Ramayana), and the *Hikayat Pandawa Jaya* (The story of the Victorious Pandawas based ultimately on the Sanskrit Mahabrata, but apparently taken directly from the old Javanese Bharatayudha. There are also wayang whose stories are based upon Javanese stories concerning the legendary pre-Islamic heroes such as Panji and Damar.

complicated syncretistic religio-magical concepts of human existence (Koentjaraningrat 1985, 453).

Found in 1922 by Ki Hajar Dewantara (1889-1959), Taman Siswa was oriented towards creating national cultural ideals based on methods of instruction which stimulated a harmonious development of the rational, spiritual, and physical abilities of the youth (Wertheim 1959, 303). Ki Hajar Dewantoro was from the Yogyakarta royal house of Pakualam, and a brother of Surjopranoto, a leader of Central Sarekat Islam. Despite the fact that he was a brother of an Islamist, he was well known for his constant reaction to the rising tide of Islamic reform. The birth of Taman Siswa was said to have marked and initiated the beginning of clear antagonism between the Central Sarekat Islam (the santri movement) and the Taman Siswa (the priyayi movement). Taman Siswa is also said to be a result of a cultural confirmation that Islam was not to be regarded as the only basis for national identity (Ricklefs 1993, 177).

Perhaps the idea of establishing Taman Siswa came when Dewantoro joined a Javanese mystical group in Yogyakarta, where Muhammadiyah, the santri educational and social movement was found. This mystical group felt that a truly indigenous educational system was needed. Upon finding the Taman Siswa he combined European style of education and traditional Javanese arts of the past. He hence expressed through this educational institution his priyayi norms of Western idealism and archaic Javanism.

Taman Siswa endeavoured to produce a system of education for Indonesian youth. It was aimed at providing education on an Indonesian nationalist foundation and to raise the youth in a harmonious atmosphere. It was also aimed at giving

attention to a full and balanced development of all faculties of heart and mind and awaken among the Indonesian youth a consciousness of their place and task in the world they were living in.

In order to achieve their dreams the priyayis had done a great deal of work in line with the doctrine of archaic Javanism. Among their doctrine is the so-called doctrine of *ikhtiyar* (originally an Arabic word, which means a human endeavour), a concept that indoctrinates people to work hard to achieve something no matter how difficult the situation is. It is from this meaning of the intensification of a work ethos that the Javanese proverb *rawe-rawe rantas malang malang putung* (all things that are hanging down must be pushed aside and all obstacles must be broken into pieces) means. This proverb is often heard in the *wayang* performances and pronounced by the high rank state officials. The phrase is also often pronounced when a group of people are about to perform collective action to remove a major obstacle. It is also a saying to intensify the spirit of co-operation, namely the spirit of *gotong royong* (mutual corporation), which is also one of Pancasila's dogma.

In archaic Javanism they also learn that the ultimate goal of human life is being connected to the idea of merit. With exception of those priyayis who are engaged in *kebatinan*<sup>11</sup> they do not connect the idea of merit to the ancient Hindu-Buddhist idea of *karma* but rather with concrete ideals of achievement in this life (Koentjaraningrat 1985, 455). It is this kind of thinking that confers status and power

---

<sup>11</sup> *Kebatinan* literally means inwardness. The term is used to describe the indigenous mystical sects with hybrid theologies. The history of this theology is not well-recorded. However since 1957 *kebatinan* groups had sought recognition from the government as the equal of other religions. Islamic groups had always opposed this. It was once recognised by the government as "belief" (*Kepercayaan*), which the 1945 constitution appears to recognise alongside other religions, and thus equal to them. The debate as to whether *kebatinan* should be considered as a religion, belief or merely cultural phenomenon had recently finally ended. Not long ago, before the downfall of Soeharto, the Muslims succeeded in persuading the government to regard *kebatinan* merely as a cultural phenomenon and not belief or religion.

on the priyayi and thus drives them to build the nation on the basis of merit in this life. This doctrine is an outward symbol of achievement and hard work as well as an inclination for good life, sufficient wealth, status and power.

The fact that the movement of Taman Siswa originated in the Javanese city of Yogyakarta, and the establishment of its first school there, gave it a strong Javanese orientation. During its initial years from 1922 to 1930s the national character of the educational system largely emphasised on archaic Javanism. This was achieved by including Javanese language, literature, history, and the Javanese art of dance and music in its curriculum. Other elements of its norms such as Indonesian nationalism was introduced latter. Geography and ethnography of the Indonesian Archipelago, which taught the pupils about the existence of other regions, its cultures and norms outside Java were also taught latter. Once the elements of Indonesian nationalism was taught, the Taman Siswa was given a wider national orientation and thus the movement was now far from being regionalist or exclusive, though dogmatically speaking it was still exclusive in the sense that it did not belong to all but to the priyayi alone. Like Budi Utomo, Taman Siswa adopted Indonesian as the official national language (Koentjaraningrat 1985, 74).

The idea of adopting the Indonesian language as a 'language for all' by Taman Siswa and Budi Utomo- perhaps stems from the fact that the priyayi does not recognise the idea of exclusivism. They only recognise a person's relationship with his fellow human beings as co-operative with the fellowship deemed as the most important concern of priyayi. They only recognise behaviour, manner and etiquette that are collaterally oriented. The idea that a person does not stand alone in this world is very important to the priyayi. A person must know that he/she can not live unless

he/she relies on his/her fellow human beings. This doctrine consequently imposes on the priyayi the obligation to maintain good relations with other human beings, and to pay constant attention to their needs and share with them as much as possible. The priyayi's co-operative inclusivism is expressed in the following Javanese phrase, *wonten sakedik dipundum saketik, wonten katah inggih dipundum katah*, which means "if there is only little each will receive little, but if there is much each will receive much". At the religious level the priyayis hold religious gatherings such as *slametan* feasts and celebrations. This co-operative spirit and inclusivism is drawn from archaic Javanism and therefore constituted an important part of priyayi norms.

However, within the first decade of its existence, thanks to the priyayi's doctrine of co-operative inclusivism, forty Taman Siswa schools were established at other places in Central and East Java, in the Sundanese area of West Java, in East Sumatra, in South and East Kalimantan and in Bali. This confirms thus, that the priyayi's Javanism has no rigidly structured system of social relations, especially as it concerns co-operative functions.

Subsequently, besides education, the movement aimed at gaining independence from the Dutch. It was bound to render an essential service as an expression of its desire for cultural and political independence (Wertheim 1959, 304). It was for this precise reason that the Taman Siswa movement could be considered as an important Javanese priyayi element in the general Indonesian nationalistic movement. Taman Siswa was thus transformed from being an educational movement into a political one. However, although its aim was now for independence, its framework remained that of education. It continued to struggle for political independence through education. Its leaders on the other hand, seemed to be quite



aware that education had a very important function in the political arena in general and for independence in particular (Frederick 1989, 48-9).

Thus, the priyayi had indeed given a general framework and an intellectual contribution as to how the common national identity should look like. The rise of the priyayi's educational movements of Budi Utomo and Taman Siswa is therefore to be deemed an integral part of the broad history of Indonesian nationalism on the one hand, and the history of searching for common national identity on the other.

Yet despite all its idealism, Taman Siswa had failed to build a common national identity shared by all citizens. Instead of being accepted by Indonesians, the norms of Taman Siswa were welcomed mostly by the Javanese and thus stimulated the growth of a Javanese identity. This after all, tells us that the people refused to accept the synthesis of the glorious Javanese past, Western idealism, and modern nationalist norms as suggested by the priyayi. Furthermore, within the priyayi grew a radical endeavour to create an extreme mental attitude of self-sufficiency that tended to develop towards Javanese isolationism away from the dynamic thinking towards an Indonesian national culture (Koentjaraningrat 1985, 75). Thus, the process of transformation from being co-operative into discriminative had taken place within the stream of priyayi.

This failure and internal problem resulted in priyayi being divided into two groups, a division that definitely weakened the cultural power of the priyayi. The two are: the literati group and the intelligentsia. The former was more concerned with the restoration and preservation of only the indigenous sophisticated Javanese tradition in an exclusive and puritan manner. The intelligentsia claimed to be the mediator of their society with their syncretic structure. They were cultural middlemen, a group

who increasingly become skilful and based their claims to political and social ascendancy on their achieved skills.

Through the period of rising nationalism on the eve of independence the political tendencies among the priyayi intelligentsia were increased and thus political parties started to emerge.

The PNI, *Partai Nasional Indonesia*, (The Indonesian National Party) was the priyayi intelligentsia's party. Under the influence of Budi Utomo's and Taman Siswa's ideas of national unity (Legge 1980, 132-3) the party was found in July 1927. This party was not only a political party in the sense that it was not only concerned with an immediately applicable political program, but it also desired to establish an entire way of life and philosophy of the social order. Although the party's elements were mainly Javanese its membership was Indonesian. A paradox characterised the movement: although divided by enormous cultural, social and ideological differences it was permeated by an enthusiasm for national unity. This emphasis on unity concealed a wide variety of opinion on what form independent Indonesia should like. By now the priyayi intelligentsia had introduced more emphatically an element of their norm to the national life, namely the necessity of national unity. This norm was subsequently adopted as one of the Pancasila values.

The priyayi intelligentsia dominated the PNI movement and continued to emphasise their norms of Western idealism and modern nationalism, while to some extent disregarding the archaic Javanism. I call their set of norms and ideas, using R. William Liddle's term, "Bureaucratic Populism" (1985, 81).

A number of Indonesia's early leaders including the first Indonesian vice president Muhammad Hatta (1902-1980) and Sutan Sjahrir (1909-1966), the first

prime minister, belonged to this group. Sukarno though, is not part of this group. He had no formal ideological connection with them although his name was widely associated with the PNI. The priyayi intelligentsia came from the new elite which had grown as a result of education and employment opportunities within the Netherlands Indies. In the colonial period the priyayi intelligentsia of the cities politically and culturally dominated the country and came to constitute Westernised enclaves. The PNI thus essentially stemmed from the Indonesian urban elites who placed a premium on positivism and technology, Westernised education, liberal traditions of nineteenth-century Europe, and urban life-style. It was in the cities that the priyayi kindled the fire of nationalism, and here that they led the people and introduced to them the word "independence". From the beginning then the priyayi intelligentsia were products of urban and Western culture.

The PNI thus, in effect, sought to create a bourgeois civilisation in the Western sense of the word based upon a substantial middle class, a developed economy and a stable entrenchment of state control of the economy (Van der Kroef 1954, 66). This in turn left a gap that the priyayi intelligentsia had attempted to fill with numerous Western secular and nationalist dogma, the activities of new nationalist association, and nationalistic patriotic anthems and speeches. While these efforts did appear to have meaning for the priyayi intelligentsia, as a small but rising sector of the new national elite, they remained empty for the majority of Indonesians, the peasantry. The native population, the peasantry lived in altogether different circumstances with entirely different kinds of norms. The priyayi were not quite aware that the character of their nationalist movement and its norms had not been determined by the culture of this largest and traditionally the most important section of the population. In addition,

not only did the priyayi try to impose their norms on the peasantry, they also placed no room for the peasant norms in their system (Legge 1980, 10).

Furthermore, the village community was also under attack by the priyayis from all directions. In their enthusiasm to modernise Indonesia their political leaders believed that they had to change the customs of the village. They believed that the villages were not able to find sufficient resources within its social body to absorb the required changes. This assumption among the majority of priyayi leaders made them frequently unaware of the strength of the indigenous way of the village.

It was the santris who met the need of rural Indonesia. The santris gave the answer for the need of the village societies. They, to a significant degree, represented the indigenous way of life, the village life of the peasantry, the majority of the population.

### **Santri and the Norms of Islamic Salvationism-Universalism**

#### ***A. Islamic Salvationism***

The acceptance of Islam in Indonesia had been to some extent, as some would argue, (Geertz 1968/Feith 1964, 261) nominal and superficial, intense only in certain restricted areas or movements of the past four generations. As a result, some Javanese remained aloof and essentially Hindu in their culture.

Purely pagan pockets also remained with some having respectable bodies of ethnic customs codified under the Dutch regime whose policies were favouring the retention of Western culture in a pure form, while encouraging the separate continuance of all regional, local and above all religious cultures. Under the policy of *divide and rule* only Christians or nominal Muslims, namely the priyayi and abangan could work for the government. They earned good money while the santris were not

more than “guests in their own homes”. The santris were discriminated against by the government even after independence.

With the emergence of the self-conscious movements in post-independent Indonesia, movements represented by the santri were not easily welcomed. The priyayis and the abangans strongly resented any Islamic self-consciousness movement. Nevertheless, it became the property of the majority of people, the peasantry, a majority around whom the general movement toward Islamic self-conscious has commonly been associated.

The majority of population are simultaneously Muslim and santri. In principle they are Sunnis and followers of the Shafii school of law. Many of them are pious and involved in Sufi mysticism, notably the Shattariya, Qadariya, and Naqshabandiyya sufi orders.

As nationalism began to grow among the people the santri following the establishment of Budi Utomo, began to think about establishing Islamic religious leadership. An Islamic consciousness was launched on the most significant period of reform in its history. In 1909 a group of Javanese santris under the leadership of Tirtoadisurjo, who previously worked for the Dutch governmental service and left to become a journalist, founded Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Commercial Union) in Batavia, now Jakarta (Ricklefs 1993, 166). Tirtoadisurjo was succeeded by H.O.S Tjokroaminoto (1882-1934). Tjokroaminoto was a charismatic figure who became known for his belligerent attitudes towards those in authority whether Dutch or Indonesian, and was soon to become the most prominent leader of the early popular nationalistic movement. In 1912 the organisation changed its name to Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union, SI) and aimed essentially at gaining independence and providing an

Islamic social basis for the Indonesian state. Normally speaking, given that the SI's leaders were educated in Dutch educational institutions, the SI's norms must have contained some elements of Western idealism. It must also have contained a norm of nationalism since it was destined to become the nationalist vanguard of a new Muslim political movement.

But the Islamic origins of the organisation, the term Islam in its title, and its membership that was dominated by the santri reflected little more than a general awareness that its members were Muslims-santri while the Christians, the Chinese as well as priyayi and abangan were not. In the eyes of the "others" it became an expression of santri-Islamic solidarity against everything non-Islamic and everyone non-santri including priyayi and abangan. For most santri leaders the problem of national identity was however a problem of choosing Islamic identity as the identity of the state rather than a problem of choosing among essentially differing identities or traditions (Cribb 1995, 39-40). Religious and cultural pluralism were thus seen as something that in fact did not exist. Non-Islamic religions including Christianity, other norms including Western idealism, archaic Javanism and Indonesian nationalism were in essence unlawful since Islam as the dominant ideology of the vast majority of Indonesian Muslims by its doctrine was deemed as the only valid basis for the common identity of all Indonesians. The santri in general and more so the very traditionalist ones did not admit any competitors for Islam.

Indeed there is nothing wrong in Islam being the basis for the common identity of the state since its laws served to make people good. It encouraged persons to be righteous, to be a "person of virtue". But the problem is more than merely Islamic

norms being good or bad for the basis of the state. The problem is that in a pluralistic society an exclusive ideology is not acceptable by the “others”.

*B. Muhammadiyah: Puritan Islamism*

At the educational level the first santri socio-educational movement to be found was Muhammadiyah, which was established in Yogyakarta in 1912 under the leadership of Ahmad Dahlan (1868-1923). The movement was established in response to the humiliating conditions that Muslims found themselves in at the time, during which Islam came to be stigmatised not only among the aristocrats but also among the masses. Muhammadiyah was also found in response to the condition in which Islam came to be regarded as a religious and cultural anachronism unsuited to modern times (Van der Kroef 1954, 73).

Encouraged by his enthusiasm to reform the religion, Ahmad Dahlan went to Mecca in 1890 where he studied for several years. He returned home with the idea of religious reformation inspired by Muhammad Abduh of Egypt and established the movement which was aimed at improving religious education exclusively for Muslims. The movement was also active in social work by establishing hospitals and social welfare bodies through which they propagated the reformist ideas of Islam. In social welfare agencies the movement's ethical emphasis found an expression. Through these kinds of activities the movement emancipate and liberate the individual Muslim.

The chief characteristic of Muhammadiyah Islamic reform was that it appealed and tended to reflect the aspirations of an Islamic bourgeoisie (Van der Kroef 1954, 74), a rising Muslim middle class for whom the progressive rationalism and the

emphasis upon social welfare seemed an ideal adjustment of their faith to modern times. This constituted part of the movement norms which I call "puritan Islamism".

Ahmad Dahlan was previously a member of Budi Utomo movement (Ricklefs 1993, 171). Being a member of Budi Utomo, Ahmad Dahlan's idealism must more or less have reflected the norm of Bureaucratic Populism of the priyayi. The result was that, in the towns and cities of Java the Muhammadiyah attracted many priyayi intellectuals and bureaucrats, particularly those who were more tolerant in outlook. Thanks to its ubiquitous norms, the Muhammadiyah, which was originally Javanese, attracted many members not only from the urban Javanese people but also non-Javanese urban, particularly the Minangkabaus of Sumatra, from which it spread widely to the other urban areas of Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi.

The fact that the Muhammadiyah reflected some of the priyayi's norms of Bureaucratic Populism and lacked the norms of popular or traditional Islamism, resulted in it being restricted to the urban people only. In Java for example, the Muhammadiyah's ideas took strongest root only in urban townships of the coastal region leaving the interior where the peasantry are to be found especially in central and east Java untouched.

Because it lacked the norms of popular or traditional Islamism and due to its purification efforts, the Muhammadiyah criticised many customs which pious Muslim Javanese had believed for centuries to be the true Islam. The result was that the Muhammadiyah's growth was slow. Further, it faced opposition from the old fashioned Islamic teachers of the countryside, from the recognised religious hierarchies as well as from pious communities who rejected the Muhammadiyah's



modernist ideas. In its early years Muhammadiyah thus brought much hostility rather than betterment to the religious community, particularly of Java.

Despite all the shortcomings the Muhammadiyah had indeed marked a new foundation that more precision Islam being laid well. Perhaps it was only in the time when the movement was found that Islam definitively arrived to crystallise into an aggressive counter-tradition.

Politically, its conception for the ideals of the state is quite difficult to trace. All we can say is that the movement is chiefly characterised by its tendency to reflect the aspirations of an Islamic bourgeoisie, a rising Muslim middle class, for whom progressive rationalism and the emphasis upon social welfare seemed an ideal adjustment of their faith to modern times. It also reflected the norms of Bureaucratic Populism of the priyayi in addition to its own norm of puritan Islamism with the nationalistic implication of the movement lying in its arousal of self-consciousness and anti-Dutch feeling among its members (Sievers 1974,152). *repetition*

#### *C. The Nahdatul Ulama': Islamic Traditionalism*

Another major Muslim santri movement was found in 1926 called the *Nahdatul ulama* (NU). Unlike the Muhammadiyah, the NU is traditionalist. Equally the NU was found under the influence of some Middle Eastern ideas of reformism, particularly Wahhabism. The immediate agent of this process is the pilgrimage (*hajjis*) to Mecca. Upon their return from the Holy Land the more earnest among the *Hajjis* founded educational religious boarding schools called the *pesantren* to instruct young men in what they took to be the true and neglected teaching of the Prophet.

However, if the puritan Islamism of Muhammadiyah control the north-south coast Javanese regions, in the Javanese interior the NU is more dominant. The NU

ideas are widely accepted by the people in the interior thanks to its norms of "Islamic traditionalism" which represents the people's basic religious creed. The *pesantren*<sup>12</sup> institutions are the primary means used by the NU to propagate their ideas of religious reform through the acquisition of certain desirable character and trait. Also through the development of a proper philosophy of life, manners, polish and restrain together with the accumulation and retention of factual knowledge or saleable vocational skills. Hundreds of *pesantrens* had been established throughout the island of Java. The imam of the *pesantren* is called a *kyai*.<sup>13</sup> From the Javanese sage the *kyais* are the leaders of the *santri* *pesantren* communities as well as any community or anyone who has been educated in the *pesantren* at any time in his life, or anyone who sympathises with the sentiments fostered by the *pesantrens*.

The NU *kyais* stiffly resisted the inroads of non-Islamic political idealism. Encouraged by a new religious orthodoxy they used the unsettled times to propagate their own political views, notably those which advocated the establishment of the *Ummat Islam*, an all-Moslem state and society based on Islamic law, the *Sharia* (Cribb 1995, 53).

---

<sup>12</sup> As was explained, *pesantren* is an Islamic religious school where the *santri* communities are supposed to learn Islam. The word *pesantren* itself is derived from the word *santri*. As a matter of fact, most of *pesantrens* are not established by NU as a collectivity or organisation, but by individuals who happened to be members of the NU. There are two kinds of *pesantren*. One is *pesantren traditional*, the other is *pesantren modern*. Most of NU *pesantrens* are traditional. They are called traditional because unlike the modern *pesantren*, they follow a very traditional and rigid way of teaching Islamic sciences. The modern *pesantren* follow a "modern" and interpretative method of teaching Islamic knowledge. Modern *pesantren* also teaches history, foreign languages like English, geography and so on.

<sup>13</sup> Following the distinction between *pesantren traditional* and *pesantren modern*, there are two kinds of *kyai*. One is *kyai traditional* (a leader of *pesantren traditional*), and the other is *kyai modern* (a leader of *pesantren modern*). *Kyai traditional* are rural in outlook and traditional in thought. *Kyai modern* by contrast are modern in outlook, and often more dynamic.

As nationalism began to grow more strongly among the santris the split along the lines of the traditionalist NU and the modernist Muhammadiyah became apparent. The traditionalist conservative elements were led by a coalition of the rural Qur'anic teachers and larger Muslim landholders while the modernist elements were led by a coalition of the leaders of the santri bureaucracy. The modernists were heavily influenced by the ideas of the reformist scholars in the intellectual centre of the Muslim world Cairo which tended to be urban, while the former group was influenced by Mecca, and tended to be more rural.

To this end, there are three main santri movements being discussed here. These are Sarekat Islam, Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama. Sarekat Islam was a political party set up partly as a response to the Chinese competition and partly as a response to the growing dissatisfaction with Dutch rule. Its norm is what I have called Islamic Salvationism. The second is Muhammadiyah which is more a charitable movement than a political party. Its vigorous Islamic reformist doctrines which opposed ritualism and syncretism stimulated antagonism between them and the more conservative rural Qur'anic teachers of the kyais as well as the fanatic priyayi and abangan. Its norm is Puritan Islamism with a little flavour of Bureaucratic Populism. The third is the Nahdatul Ulama, the conservative organisation with a very large membership whose kyais were making political demand that the state be based on a rigid understanding of Islamic law. Their norm is an Islamic Traditionalism. These norms of Puritan Islamism and Islamic Traditionalism constitute the norm of -what I call Islamic Universalism. Thus around the 1930's three santri nationalist organisations had appeared on the scene. The first is a non-cooperative political party that agitated for certain amount of political -and to a lesser extent- economic reform

(Sarekat Islam). The second is an enthusiastically modernist social organisation engaged in various kinds of charitable activities (Muhammadiyah), and the third is a less dynamic but larger conservative group with hundreds of educational institutions (the NU). The traditionalist NU seemed to have the vision that the state ought to be an out-and-out orthodox Muslim state. The modernist Muhammadiyah believed that the state could be either a religiously oriented middle-class culture with certain qualified liberalistic-rationalistic overtones, or it could mean modernism, socialism and some opposition to "archaic" Islam. And the SI, seemed to believe that the state should be an "Islamised" Western democratic state.

Another development, prompted by the contemplation among the santris to end the antagonism between the NU and the Muhammadiyah, was the decline of the controversies between the orthodox and the modernist wings in the mid 30's. This was partly as a result of Islamic leadership being progressively isolated from both political and cultural development and facing an increasingly hostile treatment from both colonial regime and non-santri groups. Both wings of the NU and Muhammadiyah began to accept that whatever their differences they were united in their devotion to Islam. In September 1937 leaders of the NU and the Muhammadiyah took the initiative in order to create the *Majlis Islam A'la Indonesia* (Supreme Islamic Council of Indonesia, MIAI). Other Islamic organisations throughout Indonesia including Sarekat Islam virtually joined to represent the ultimate union of major Islamic movements. In October 1943 when Indonesia was under Japanese occupation MIAI was dissolved and replaced by Masjumi (*Majlis Syuro*

*Indonesia*, Consultative Council of Indonesia).<sup>14</sup> This ultimate union of many major Islamic parties into a single Masjumi party has by no means led to greater religious unity among Indonesian Muslims. Indeed within that umbrella, the modernist Muhammadiyah continued to embrace most of the tenets of Islamic modernism according which the state could be based on anything as long as it supported the need to restore the original purity of Islam. The centre right-wing of the NU continued to envisage a traditionalist vision as the groundwork of an orthodox all-Muslim state.

The Muhammadiyah doctrine of puritan Islamism and the NU norm of Islamic traditionalism that met in the political party of Masjumi, gave birth to a new political doctrine. Among its doctrine was the party's goals to implement the teaching of the Prophet and the law of Islam in the life of individuals, society and the Indonesian Republican state (Cribb 1995, 52). Masjumi's leaders from both Muhammadiyah and NU shared the belief that the state should be guided by the ethics of Islam in formulating policy. In doing so, Masjumi had evolved a fairly consistent program as to what a Muslim Indonesian state would be like. In the first place it would foster the closest possible connection between religious law and secular law. They thus recognised the freedom of religion as the fundamental principle of the state,<sup>15</sup> which meant that the Muslim should be free to practice their religious imperative, and they would respect the freedom of other faiths. Religious tolerance thus became the very basis of this party. This principle was expressed in the so-called Piagam Jakarta<sup>16</sup>

---

<sup>14</sup> For more detail and a sophisticated discussion on Masjumi, its leaders, and political vision, see Herbert Feith's *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*. pp 134-8. However, when Masjumi was formed it included all the major schools of Islamic social and political thought in Indonesia because it inherited both the name and the organisational framework of an umbrella Islamic organisation. By 1952 most of the Muslim traditionalists of the NU withdrew from it.

<sup>15</sup> Robert Cribb and Colin Brown had somehow argued along this line. See Cribb's *Indonesia: A History Since 1945*, pp 52-3

<sup>16</sup> The main text of Piagam Jakarta read "...that the state is to be based upon "belief in God" with the obligation for adherents of Islam to carry out Islamic law". The charter was strongly opposed by the

(The Jakarta Charter), that subsequently became a source of a bitter disagreement between Muslims and the state in later years.

### *The Revolutionary Abanganism*

The priyayi and the santri have a particular characteristic with regards to their norms, order, ideology, and particular sort of structure. But as regards the abangans, their norms, order, ideology and structure are vague, inconsistent and incomplete in outline. It is not clear what sort of normative, ideological and structural standards the abangan followed. It had been suggested though that it followed the theoretical doctrine of Marx and Lenin (Legge 1964, 131-34). Others suggested that it did not merely follow the icons of Marxism but translated them into a vocabulary which appealed more familiar to the Indonesians, especially to the Javanese (Geertz 1973, 245). In any case, I tend to argue that the norm of abangan is vague and inconsistent. I would call their norm a "Revolutionary Abanganism" which was characterised by being reactionist against any existing norms, including that of the priyayi and santri. This norm of revolutionary abanganism had slogans such as: the abolition of all social gradation, the establishment of the much-heralded social justice, a maximum of economic equality and the ultimate creation of a genuine classless society.<sup>17</sup> Not only

---

Christians as well as by the non-santri Muslims. It was dropped by the government in 1945, allegedly under the pressure of Japanese occupation authority in Indonesia. However, when in 1965 a modernist Islamic political party called Parmusi (Partai Muslimin Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Party) was established, the notion of Piagam Jakarta once again surfaced. The party urged the government to recognise the constitutional authority of the Piagam and thus of Islamic Law among Muslims. This proposal was rejected. It was only recently though that the government agreed that Muslims could implement Islamic Law in the area of family law. However, the recent implementation of Islamic family law had nothing to do with Piagam Jakarta.

<sup>17</sup> This is a slogan of the Communists. But my thesis is that the communism was identical to the abanganism, and thus everything/everyone communist must be abangan, and vice versa.

did they demand political independence but also economic and individual independence from any class rule and economic hardship.

At the grassroots level they never forwarded the concept of a common national identity, nationalism, or concept of national citizenship for the modern Indonesian state. They were more concerned with establishing a completely egalitarian social order (Van der Kroef 1954, 67).

In addition, the abangan world view were not expressed through educational institutions, the fact that makes an effort to understanding their norm through their educational system become impossible. They were rather expressed themselves through the political movement of PKI, *Partai Komunis Indonesia*, the Communist Party of Indonesia.

Abangan revolutionary action against the other two social systems which often caused tense antagonism between them is easily documented. Historically, the resentment of the abangan against the priyayi ruling aristocracy and the santri trading class is obviously of long standing (Geertz 1969, 170). But while the tension between the abangan and the priyayi was rather suffocating because of the general relativism of the two groups, the conflict between abangan and the santri was more severe. The antagonism between abangan and santri had in fact started as early as the 16th century, since the conflict between the Hindu-Buddhist Central Javanese kingdom of Mataram and the north Islamic coast harbour kingdoms such as Demak, Gresik, and Surabaya (Geertz 1969, 170).

In the history of modern Indonesia, in so far as the conflict between the santri and the abangan was focused on ideological patterns, the santri universalism and salvationism draw the relativistic abangan's fire. Muslim santris especially those

under the influence of the Islamic authority of the NU strongly refused to give any recognition to the abangan. Through religious institutions such as mosque, school, and pesantren, which not only has religious but also organisational influence as well, the santris who are subject to the highest Islamic authority of the NU can be easily mobilised in order to isolate the abangan. Theologically, the NU even sometimes accuse the abangan of being idol-worshippers.

The fact that the abangan was isolated by the santri directed the abangan into the war against the santri in terms of a primordial struggle. This became more apparent when the abangan were associated with the PKI, which was known for its violent and illegitimate way of implementing action. Being affiliated with the PKI, the abangan received very little legitimacy from the santri and from the majority of the people.

### **III. Sukarno and the Institutionalisation of Norms**

In chapter II we explored the nature of the norms of the three social systems. In this chapter we will be dealing with the question of how these norms were integrated into the value system of Pancasila.

The word value will be used here to describe the normative component of Pancasila.

From our discussion above it becomes clear that there was a socio-religious split and antagonism within Indonesian community between santri, priyayi and abangan. As was explained the most important factor for this split and antagonism was the divergent structure of the norm-oriented system. The priyayi based their norm on Bureaucratic Populism, namely the amalgamation of Western Idealism,



Indonesian Nationalism, and Archaic Javanism. The santris based their norms on Islamic Universalism-Salvationism, as the Muhammadiyah on Puritan Islamism, the NU on Islamic Traditionalism and the SI on Islamic Salvationism. Abangans based their norm on a Revolutionary Abanganism inspired to some extent by the revolutionary doctrine of Leninism and Marxism. With their norms they were the contending streams of thought and culture that emerged about three decades or so before the independence. Each competed with the other in introducing their norms as the basis for the common national identity and the basis for the national rejuvenation in Indonesia. The priyayi stream was represented by Budi Utomo and Taman Siswa, the santri stream typified by SI, Muhammadiyah and NU, whereas the abangan was represented by a political party, PKI.

The emergence of Budi Utomo and Taman Siswa as the representatives of the priyayi, SI, Muhammadiyah and NU as the representatives of the santri, and PKI as the representative of abangan, more or less signified that at all levels Indonesia was abnormally susceptible to serious alienation based on -what Geertz called "religious" primordial attachment (1963, 109). That is to say that their association with a particular party or movement was stemmed from the "givenness" of socio-religious identity and existence, from the immediate religious and social intimacy. Namely, that they were "born into particular religious community".

In addition to these representatives there was an extraordinary proliferation of new organisations among the educational elite most of which was based on ethnic identities. Sarekat Ambon (Ambon Association) for the Ambonese, Sarekat Pasundan (Pasundan Association) for the Sundanese, Sarekat Sumatra (Sumatra Association) for the Sumatrans, Kaum Betawi (Batavia Tribe) for the Jakartans and many others. The

birth of these groups not only reflected the new enthusiasm for an organisation but most importantly reflected the continuing strength of ethnic and race identities. Their existence only added to the uncertainty as to whether a common national identity shared by all Indonesians devoid of any particular race, ethnicity or religion was necessary or not. They only increased the sense of disunity among Indonesians. Instead of a sense of a shared national identity they prioritised ethnicity and they became concerned as to which ethnic group would lead the country. Instead of a general belief that Indonesians had to have something in common they preferred to focus on local identities.

The fact remained that groups formed on ethnic or religious bases were virtually never considered as possible self-standing, maximal social units or as candidates for common nationhood. It had to be admitted though that some of these ethnic-based organisations were concerned with the aggregation of defined, specially outlined traditional primordial groups into larger more diffuse units, whose implicit frame of reference was not the local scene but the "nation" in the sense of the whole society. Nonetheless they remained discriminative especially when it came to the problem of a "common" identity.

The very basic need that the nation was busy looking for, namely the need for a central common ground existing beyond ethnic-religious diversity remained lacking. Each of these social systems with their representatives and ideological ideals left this central issue unresolved and even further prevented the common identity from being present.

Following this early period of search for national identity which was characterised with antagonism between the contending systems and streams, Sukarno

(1901-70) emerged. In his hand, the idea of a national Indonesian identity devoid of a specific religious or regional ties had begun to be introduced.<sup>18</sup>

Sukarno had already occupied a position as the most dynamic political thinker in the colony since the late 1920's.<sup>19</sup> Unlike any other thinkers, his ideology was unique. It was an eclectic blend of all major norms, systems, and streams of thought in the emerging Indonesian movements.<sup>20</sup> He was a genuine pan-Indonesian nationalistic leader who sought to create a culture above and beyond the orientations of abangan peasantry, priyayi elite, Muslim santri or any regional and cultural orientations. He was the leader that was aware from the beginning that in Indonesia none of the Islamic norms of Universalism-Salvationism, priyayi norms of Bureaucratic Populism, or the Revolutionary Abanganism, were to be regarded as effectively predominant norm, system or tradition.<sup>21</sup> He undertook the task of searching for a national identity by taking up the task of blending and adapting those norms of the major existing social systems. Hence, Sukarno thought about Indonesia in more *evaluative* or *selective* terms rather than in a *cognitive* or *discriminative* way. He found justification for a form of nationalism which was devoid of any specific Islamic commitment or formal link to a particular religious and ethnic group. He

---

<sup>18</sup> There are still a lot of things to be studied about Sukarno, especially that the new government of Mr Habibie had allowed Sukarno's major works to be republished. His works including *Sarinah*, *Indonesia Menggugat* (Indonesia Protesting), *Di Bawah Bendera Revolusi* (Under the Banner of Revolution), and *Penyambung Lidah Rakyat* (The People's Conveyer ). All these Sukarno's works were banned by Soeharto when the latter was in power for 32 years.

<sup>19</sup> Benjamin Higgins described Sukarno as a "symbol of continuity". See Higgins, 1963, 79.

<sup>20</sup> See Kahin's *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, p 90

<sup>21</sup> Allen M. Sievers suggested that besides refusing to accept any exclusive idealism, Sukarno in fact appealed to "adat" as the basis for his ideology. See Sievers' *The Mystical World of Indonesia: Culture and Economic Development in Conflict*, p 21. Adat is a kind of local law but it has never been codified or standardised. It possessed the full force of law under the Dutch and was modified by the Dutch authority to suit their ends. By Sukarno adat was nationalised and it was from adat -as Sievers suggests- that Sukarno derived his doctrines of a national statecraft based on village patterns of governance.

absorbed priyayi and santri norms, considered revolutionary abanganism, and in addition, absorbed his own understanding of Western ideas into a unique synthesis which he found satisfactory to be a model for the Indonesian nation as a whole (Ricklefs 1993, 182).

He was a son of a Javanese schoolteacher, a member of the lower rank of Javanese priyayi. He learnt something from the leader and the founder of the Islamic Union, the first mass nationalist organisation in Indonesia, H.O.S Tjokroaminoto (Kahin 1952, 90) from whom the future leaders of all wings, Islamist, Traditionalist, Nationalist and Marxist emerged. Sukarno was regularly in touch with Tjokroaminoto. Sukarno's first wife, Utari was Tjokroaminoto's daughter and it was by virtue of Tjokroaminoto indoctrination that Sukarno moved along a rising curve of ideological enthusiasm (Geertz 1968, 83). Sukarno was also under the influence of Taman Siswa's and Budi Utomo's ideals (Legge 1964, 132-33) as well as Tjipto Mangunkusumo's (1885-1943) and Douwes Dekker's (1879-1951) thought, who were the founders of the political nationalist party, The *Indische Partij*.

When young Sukarno advocated ideas on Indonesian unity to unify the various norms, ethnic and religious cultures, criticised imperialism and colonialism, and urged non-co-operation with the colonial government in pursuing independence, he was readily accepted as a leader. In his hand emerged the concept of a common national system as an identity that he hoped would be able to unify the country by which any norms, systems, or doctrine would be subordinated to its set of values and ideals, hereby denying the existence of an exclusive system. Sukarno soon appeared to have achieved a relatively united front of the main Indonesian political, social and religious organisations. The representatives of the priyayi, santri and abangan as well as and

Christians joined him and found a body called PPPKI<sup>22</sup> in 1928. The idea of an all-Indonesian as a common denominator was now growing. The intellectual leaders of almost all systems, ethnic and regionalist groups, Christians and Chinese as well as Arab communities also endorsed this new initiative.

The problem with PPPKI was that religious primordialism was still alive within it and even divided the movement. The unity achieved by PPPKI was thus becoming superficial. The santri withdrew from the organisation in 1930 because the other groups refused to give Islam the recognition that the Islamic leaders thought it deserved. The santri leadership could not accept the idea of “non-Islamic” nationalism that they thought to be the ideology of PPPKI. The reaction of the Islamic leadership was hostile. The Minangkabau Muslim thinker Muhammad Natsir (1908-94) for example, emerged in this period as a leading Islamic polemicist. In 1931 Natsir wrote articles which argued that only Islam could be the basis of an Indonesian nationality. Muslims, he argued, must struggle for a state which would serve Islam and in which Islamic law and Muslim leaders would be dominant (Ricklefs 1993, 189). He was fundamentally unable to see how in a country where the majority was Muslim, anything other than Islam could seriously be proposed as the basis for national identity. Most traditional Muslims also, like the NU tended to see that PPPKI as “secular” and thus would eradicate the religious basis of the state and with it its Islamic basis.

The Muslim santris felt alienated within the PPPKI. This caused conflict that resulted in political instability and chronic dissatisfaction within the movement. The

---

<sup>22</sup> Permusyawaratan Perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia (Union of Political Associations of the Indonesian People). This included: PNI, Partai Sarekat Islam, Budi Utomo, Pasundan, Sumatra Bond, and the Surabaya Study Club.

loose unity represented by PPPKI thus confirmed the idea that a nationalism devoid of regional or religious norms and ties was a possible basis for joint action. But this implied that joint action would almost certainly bypass the Islamic groups who would therefore find themselves isolated from the main stream of political leadership.

The next step to be taken by Sukarno<sup>23</sup> after the failure of the PPPKI was to find a bridge that could link the gap between the various and conflicting groups. This bridge had to be not merely political, like PNI or PPPKI, but one that contained values and a symbolic force. The values had to include those that affect the most fundamental needs of individuals such as the needs for definition of individuals and the continuity of their norms, meaning and identity. The symbolic force had to play a mediator role in the society where religious primordial conflict tended to extend to over all the components and levels of society. It is thought that Sukarno must have encouraged a bridge that could mediate the particularistic norms on the one hand, and build an operative religio-political tool on the other. As far as the norms of the three social systems were concerned, Sukarno did not have any other choice but to combine those three *alternatives*. That is to say, to *select* or *evaluate* them together. He was forced to invent preconditions and a medium where communication between these *alternatives* was possible. This medium had to be formed from a constellation of norms of various alternatives in such a way that not only could the contending

---

<sup>23</sup> Three phases of Sukarno's thought are fairly distinguished:

1. Confrontational agitation against Dutch colonialism characterised by mass mobilisation. An example of this, is his involvement in mobilising the youth in Jakarta in 28 October 1928 in which the notorious Sumpah Pemuda was announced.
2. The establishment of political party and other movements such as PNI and PPPKI.
3. Contemplation that led him to the establishment of a Cultural System of Pancasila. A core value that meets the norms of various groups and identities. The step mentioned above represents the third phase of Sukarno's thought.

groups communicate, but also that they should react appropriately to each other's norms. Finally, on 20 June 1949 he announced the finding of Pancasila.<sup>24</sup>

At least two decades before Pancasila was born Sukarno had already shown an inclination toward the necessity of a bridge such as Pancasila. In 28 October 1928 for example, he joined and even led the cultural and political trend towards Indonesian communalism and collectivistic consciousness formally known as a youth congress held in Batavia, now Jakarta. In its youth pledge (*Sumpah Pemuda*) the congress adopted three ideas: One father land, Indonesia; One nation, Indonesia; and One language, Bahasa Indonesia. Sukarno's involvement in such trends clearly marks his intellectual phase centred around the need to create a "single" country, and to synthesise the norms of the contending political camps -Islamist, Marxist, and Nationalist (Geertz 1968, 85); namely *santri*, *priyayi*, and *abangan* camps.

In Pancasila such synthesis is positively to be found. In it the motivations of the three social systems are integrated within the normative pattern. There is in the normative pattern of the Five Principles of Pancasila -Belief in One God, Nationalism, Humanitarianism, Democracy, and Social Justice- something for everyone that is suitably distributed; for *santri*, for *abangan* and for *priyayi*, for Muslims, and non-Muslims, for Javanese, and non-Javanese.

Sukarno devoutly saw himself as the exemplar of this sort of ideological integration. He once said that "I am a follower of Karl Marx, but I am also a religious man so I can grasp the entire range between Marxism and theism... I know all the trends and understand them..... I have made myself the meeting place of all trends and ideologies. I have blended, blended, and blended them until finally they became the

---

<sup>24</sup> This particular day is celebrated annually throughout Indonesia as the Day of the Birth of Pancasila.

present Sukarno” (Geertz 1968, 85). On the other occasion he was reported to have said:

“I have no preference for one party over another. I introduce the term socialism in this book in the general sense, without seeking to establish any connection with the opinions or programs of one party or another. The ideals of socialism are not monopoly of one party, and not the property of some other group. Long before the present parties existed, long before the beginning of our revolution, yes, long before the beginning of the war in the Pacific, which made our revolution possible, did the ideals of socialism fill the hearts of many convinced members of the Indonesian movement”. Again he said “I am a nationalist, but I am also attached to socialism, because my thinking tells me that man and the world can reach a state of well-being only in socialism. And I am attached to socialism because I am attached to Islam” (Van der Kroef 1954, 103-4).

By inventing Pancasila, Sukarno was thus oriented to the attainment of certain ends, motivated to optimise gratification, behaving in a situation of various objects, and governed by certain culture of values. He expected that the three religiously oriented social systems had mutual expectations and views one another as sources of - what Parsons calls “need-gratification” and control. The situation was thus apt to produce some interaction based on mutual respect. Norms and cognitive orientations became institutionalised in common value based on mutual expectations and respect. Religious, cultural and social pluralism were then not to be regarded as the source of conflict but as the immediate, concrete and meaningful natural diversity, as the substantial content of Indonesian individuality.

By Pancasila, Sukarno did not mean to subordinate the norms of particularistic identifications of social systems in favour of an unclear generalised commitment, nor to an overarching alien civil order or even worse in favour of any particular system or religion. Rather, by Pancasila he meant to integrate them together into one unified



system of values. He seemed to be quite aware though that by subordinating them was to risk a loss of common national identity of Pancasila. Theoretically therefore, in the cosmic order of Pancasila, Indonesian society must be built on -what Geertz called- a “fellow feeling”. A feeling of a corporate sentiment of oneness, a feeling of “consciousness of kind”, which binds religiously diverse people together and overrides all differences and conflicts. Thus Pancasila constitutes a new Indonesian identity (Sastrapratedja 1996, 149) according to which a citizen is an Indonesian first and only secondly santri, priyayi, abangan, Javanese, Minangkabau, Batak, Muslim, Christian and so on. The ideology of the country was not to be based on a particular norm, religion or doctrine but on the ideology of Pancasila, the ideology of all Indonesians in the interest of a maximum unity among Indonesia’s cultural, religious and ideological streams.

# PART TWO

## **Part Two**

### **Pancasila as a Cultural System**

“Action consists of the structures and processes by which human beings form meaningful intentions and; more or less successfully, implement them in concrete situations. The word “meaningful” implies the symbolic or cultural level of representation and reference”. Parsons, *Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives*, p. 5.

Cultural system, “....is constituted by values and symbols by which the interaction occur among members of the state. A cultural system is also pattern of culture whose different parts are interrelated to form value system, and systems of expressive symbols. Parsons, *Values, Motives, and Systems of Action*, p. 55

#### ***Introduction***

Having answered the questions as to what the norms of the three social systems are and how they were institutionalised by Sukarno in a united system of Pancasila, in this chapter we are concerned with the question of what the elements of Pancasila are.

While in the previous part the approach being used was historical, in this part the approach is cultural. What I mean by a cultural approach is that culture should be taken into account when explaining the elements of the common values of Pancasila through which the society is devised to be integrated. The word “culture” implies the system of value as well as symbol.

I hope it can be clearly understood that the framework of our analysis in the previous part utilised the basic scheme of “action theory” in which the important components are norms and organisational dimensions. Educational institutions are

included into the schema of organisational dimension. From our discussion on these two dimensions of norm and organisation two levels of conflict were thus explored:

a) Norm-oriented conflict by which we meant conflict about basic assumptions as to what norms were to be the basis of the state. Namely, what sort of norms would be acceptable to be the common identity of the Indonesian state. We have explained that there were three social systems with distinct norms, santri, abangan and priyayi. They were treated as a discriminative system simply because they defined the whole society in terms of their own primordialism and thus denied the existence of others. We also saw them as primary variances that reflected the basic religious primordial differences in Indonesia.

Besides the notion of primordial difference we have also briefly conferred another key issue, namely the notion of (religious) primordial affiliation which was referred to as a religious and normative givenness that stems from the “given” religious or social identity and existence as well as from the immediate religious and social intimacy. We assumed that as a result of the social systems being discriminative the basic consensus on the definition of community was lacking, namely the consensus of what and whose norms were to prevail.

b) Organisational-oriented conflict. We explained some nationalist organisations and movements. We assumed that all those organisations and movements were nationalist in a broad sense although only some declared nationalism to be their central ideological principles. Beyond these organisations and movements with their exclusive systems and norms came Pancasila. It institutionalised the existing contending norms of particularly the three cognitive-discriminative social systems into one cultural system of Pancasila.

In the what follows, I will discuss the notion of cultural system of Pancasila. This cultural system of Pancasila will be discussed at two primary levels. Namely, Pancasila as an evaluative system (set of values, meaning, and ideas) and Pancasila as a symbolic system. The starting point of the discussion is the Parsonian conception of cultural system. Bellah's model of American Civil Religion will also simultaneously be involved in order to get a more sophisticated understanding of Pancasila. Geertz's conception of symbolic system will also be used. However, Bellah and Geertz are employed in order to avoid the mechanistic explanation of Parsonian functionalism.

## **I. Pancasila as Evaluative System**

With regard to the notion of common national identity my argument is that in Indonesia, as a result of ideological, social and religious tension, *selective* or *evaluative* normative orientation by which stable interaction between various norms can be produced, was needed. This selective normative orientation was needed because it is fundamental to the nation without which the stable system essential to the stability and integration, could not exist.

I also argue that in all societies the more stable and more effective patterns of identity are those which are shared in common by the members of society. That is to say, that in order to be effective as a facilitator of interaction between various and contending norms and as a means of social stability, an identity must consist of "culture" in which the particularity of a specific norm is transcended in terms of the communality of the normative common value. This value should be one in which the maintenance of social stability lies, and by which "communication" between the contending groups is possible. In addition, it should function as a precondition for

reciprocity and complementary of expectations, and as a prerequisite for a system to operate, and nourish the ideal of a common collectivity that raised the political, social, and religious ends of society to a new prominence. Besides normative common value, a symbolic force is also needed. A symbol that is socially structured and designed to avoid any primordial identity from existing and which represents the integration of the existing religious, cultural, and political meanings of different systems. The existence of this kind of value and symbol system is the closest possible alternative as certain norm is determined by the existence of other norm.

However, the collection of these values in Pancasila is called an *evaluative* pattern or *evaluative* system of Pancasila to which we are now turning our discussion. They are called *evaluative* because they *evaluate* or *select* various norms and put them together in one united system of values.

In the evaluative system of Pancasila, there are Five Silas or Principles. They are: (1) Belief in One God (2) Nationalism (3) Humanity (4) Democracy and (5) Social Justice/Equality. They were enunciated by Sukarno on 20 June 1945 and were included in the Preamble to the Indonesian Constitution of 1945.<sup>25</sup> These values are designed to be the shared common values crucial to the effective functioning and continued integration of the society.

This notion of shared common values however, more than any others, connects the notion of Pancasila to the conceptional framework of common value/core introduced by both Parsons (1951), Bellah (1975), and to a lesser extent Geertz (1963). In their study of American society, Parsons and Bellah -following Durkheim-

---

<sup>25</sup> *The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia*. Fourth Reprint of 1968 edition. Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia. Jakarta: Percetakan Negara RI, p 5

took for granted that in order for a society to remain viable it required a set of common values (as well as symbols) that served as a focus for moral integration. Parsons and Bellah furthermore, shared a common concern in their formulation of a system of value (Parsons 1951, Bellah 1975). They both believed that the sharing of common value patterns entailed a sense of belonging, created a solidarity among those mutually oriented to the common values, and that without attachment to the constitutive common values the collectivity tends to dissolve.

Most importantly, they believed that the sets of common value must be invested with “religious significance” if the system was to work effectively as a system of integration. Bellah specifically, more emphatically stressed that “any coherent and viable society rests upon a common set of moral understandings about good and bad, right and wrong, in the realm of individual and social action. These common moral understanding must also rest in turn upon a common set of religious understandings that provide a picture of the universe in terms of which the moral understandings make sense (Bellah 1975, ix).

Following this argument, I would argue that Pancasila as a common value began in the first place in Sukarno’s political and religious thinking. It is a unique achievement of Sukarno in a religio-political culture to alter hitherto ethnically and religiously divided community into one society. I also argue that Sukarno was determined to observe certain religious norms, political standards, and cultural criteria for *selection* and *evaluation*. It is likely though, that the institutionalisation of the first “sila” of *Belief in One God* was a result of his profound religious thinking. So much so that the other four silas were likely as a result of his contemplation of political and cultural phenomena.

The *evaluation* of different religious, political and cultural norms into one value system of Pancasila indicates, in the first place that the norms of the three social systems are irrelevant unless they are Pancasila-ised. They are irrelevant because in general and abstract terms it could be said that those norms were incompatible with the most elementary form of social order. That is to say that there was guarantee that such norms would not include a recognition of other people's norms as valuable. The existence of such norms as the latter would result therefore in the relations between individuals within society being resolved into a struggle for power. This would in turn cause what Marion J. Levy called "a war of all against all" (1952).

In so far, as Pancasila introduces a common evaluative system for all, this system defines how the relations between members of a community ought to be. It lays down values determining these relations in religious as well other political, cultural, and social terms. When we discuss the first principle of *Belief in One God*, it will be clear how Pancasila defines the relationship between individuals especially in religious terms.

Let me now explain in brief the five values of Pancasila.<sup>26</sup> The first value is *Belief in One God*. Alongside with other silas, the first sila is included in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution. The preamble states that "....the structure of Indonesia's National Independence shall be formulated in a Constitution of the Indonesian state which shall have the structural state form of a Republic of Indonesia with sovereignty of the people, and which shall be based upon: Belief in One, Supreme God....."<sup>27</sup>

---

<sup>26</sup> This explanation is derived from Alwi Dahlan's and Cris D. Waelan's *Pancasila: A Brief Introduction*.

<sup>27</sup> *The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia*. Fourth Reprint of 1968 edition. Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia. Jakarta: Percetakan Negara RI, p 5



This religious sila can be regarded as a spiritual side of Pancasila. It tells us that there is a religious quality in Pancasila. Being the first sila it tells us moreover that belief in the existence of God occupies a central place in Indonesian society. No doubt then that belief in one God stands out as a fundamental tenet of Indonesian society. While Pancasila proposed concerns to the values of humanitarianism, democracy, national unity, and social justice, the bottom line of all these values must be necessarily belief in the existence of God. Other values must be dependent on the value of *Belief in One God*.<sup>28</sup> The sila thus coheres around the Indonesian national life and symbol.

The sila of *Belief in One God* is also more than merely a locus of, say political decision. It provides religious meaning and belonging. It certainly came out of an uncertain religious *status quo*, namely from a situation where basic religious agreement on the religious value premises of the society was absent and from a situation where basic religious distrust among the members of society could not be prevented. It is obviously an answer to the coincidence of religious primordial sentiments that tend to transform the conflict into an extreme emotional response and even violent action.

The simplest political meaning of this religious sila is that the country is not to be based on a particular religious faith or norm. It is not to be based on, say the faith of Islam, nor on the norm of santri, priyayi, and abangan. This principle stipulates that Indonesians should religiously respect their fellow citizens even if they have different religious belief. This value is in addition a proclamation that Indonesia is

---

<sup>28</sup> *Penyegaran Pengamalan Pancasila: Memperingati Kesaktian Pancasila 1 Oktober 1965*. LPSI Online, edisi, 04 Oktober 1997. <http://www.lpsi.org> (No author mentioned)

“religious” state, namely a state that is based on a religious value (Ramage 1995, 14) but not on a particular religious dogma. This implies that while not antithetical to, and indeed sharing in common with the doctrine of existing religions, Pancasila did not prioritise any sects or specific religion. Pancasila was never militantly secular, and simultaneously rejected radical secularism because it is empty of religious meaning. It was also never anti-clerical and at the same time rejected militant religious triumphalism, because it provides too much religious meaning for too few. Instead, Pancasila borrows from the religious traditions and expresses them in an Indonesian vocabulary as the first principle of Pancasila.

The question remains though, which God does Pancasila refer to in the first sila, the sila of Belief in One God, *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*? Despite the significance important of the sila, these few words are rich in ambiguity, and are marvellously difficult to be understood. They are quite general and at the same time risky statements. They are broad enough to encompass particularly a wide variety of major religions including Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism. Consequently, while this sila occupies a central role in Pancasila, it also constitutes a source of further considerable controversy and even conflict among people. More orthodox Muslims for example problematised the usage of the word *Tuhan* (means God) in *Ketuhanan*. They have frequently favoured an explicit commitment to the word Allah instead of Tuhan (Morfit 1981, 840). What God does the Pancasila refer to? Is it the God of non-Muslim, since the word being used is Tuhan not Allah? Is it the God of Muslims since the God referred to is one? Or is it something else? What is apparent is that “God” here is not the God of Muslims since, the proper Arabic designation of Allah does not appear at all and there is also no commitment to submit

the state to the will of Allah. It is also not God of the Christians because the word *Esa* (which means one, namely One God) is there.

To answer this question one needs to consider the wider context in which the first sila and the use of the word *Ketuhanan* occurred. The previous part explained the context in which the first sila occurred and was institutionalised. To summarise, suffice is to say that proposals declaring Islam or any other particular religion and norm as the basis of the state were seen as divisive by other religious groups or other normative systems. This means that Islam could hardly be accepted as the basis for the common identity of the state, in the same way that there would be hardly a commitment to submit the state to the will of Allah. The use of the word *tuhan* instead of Allah is likely meant to avoid an assumption that Indonesian identity is an Islamic identity.

Second, we need to bear in mind the wider Indonesian assumptions about the nature of religion and its association with the notion of national identity. Here I will not emphatically define what religion is. Suffice to say that religion -following Clifford Geertz (1966)- is a system of symbolic forms that give profound expression to the fundamental nature of existence and serve to orient individuals and communities to their world. While I will not deliberately explain or comment on this very broad definition of religion, one thing for sure is that this definition does not presume or deny the objective truth of any given religious system. Its value is that it permits examination of the way people in a given society find ultimate meaning in their world. I will not also demonstrate here a detailed consideration of the social and historical context in which a religion evolved. We have dealt with that question in the past chapters and we have somehow explained that a religion is something that does

not exist *ex nihilo*. We have for example, examined the rise of Buddhism/Hinduism and explained how they were adapted into the Indonesian set up. We have also discussed Islam and its response to the social and historical conditions including the influence of the previous religions, namely Buddhism and Hinduism.

*Agama* is the Indonesian word for religion. This word derives from *sanskrit*<sup>29</sup> and was imported along the early Indonesian-Indian trade routes. Hinduism and Buddhisms were the official religions of the Indonesian empires before the widespread of Islam. The early Muslim preachers adopted the concept of *agama* and other elements of Hindu and Buddhist culture to validate the elements of Islam particularly when they had to preach in the predominantly Hindus-Buddhists areas. Interestingly, the early Hindus, Buddhists and Muslims in their interaction with one another assume the *agamas* of Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism as being tolerant in their very nature (Atkinson 1988, 48-51).

A latter Muslims intensified the respect for religion through its universalism and the supreme importance it placed upon the Holy Qur'an. What is more, Islam brought with it a sharp distinction between a Muslim and "people of the Book", namely Christians and Jews.

Nowadays, while the overwhelming majority of the population are Muslims, *agama Islam* live socially and historically hand in hand with non-*agama Islam* as in the past and at present. *Agama Islam* respects religious freedom for those belonging to other faiths. In this context Muslim's demand that the country be based on the Shariah does not mean that Muslims do not respect religious freedom, nor does it

---

<sup>29</sup> Sanskrit is an old Indian language. And it was the official language of the Hindu-Buddhist priests and scholars of the old Javanese royal court, in the time of Hindu-Buddhism colonialism in Java.

mean that Muslims do not recognise the existence of other faiths. In principle, Muslims are tolerant toward religious minorities. However, this is not to say that Muslims are tolerant toward such “belief” as *Kebatinan* (Javanese mysticism). Their tolerance applies only to those systems of belief already recognised as world religions such as Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism.

This denotes then, that the God in the first sila is more associated with the principle of religious tolerance, rather than with a God of love, a God of salvation, or a God of a metaphysical order. The fact that all Indonesians believe in *Tuhan* (God) albeit in different ways, can symbolise this religious tolerance, unity and corporation.

Hence the God referred to is not the Muslim God nor Christian God but rather the God of religious tolerance. Thus in the formulation of this sila what is meant by *Belief in One God*, is belief in “one” version of religious tolerance. Accordingly, this sila asserts that while each religion is allowed to proclaim its highest insights, it must preserve humble and contrite recognition of the fact that all religious faith are also right. This tenet of religious tolerance is expressed in the Pancasila’s doctrine as “*semua agama itu benar*”, which means that “all religions are right”. This doctrine created a spirit of tolerance and made any religious movement hesitant to claim official validity for its own or to demand an official monopoly for its cult. Thus the essential religious value of the first sila is religious tolerance, the value that resembles what Reinhold Niebuhr have called a “religious solution of a religious problem” (Niebuhr 1954, 134-35).

By interpreting *God* as essentially religious tolerance we have indeed understood God in Pancasila from the point of view of a socio-political image rather than from a religious or theological perspective. Interpreting God as religious

tolerance is understandable for we are linking the God of Pancasila with other terms such as the notion of *agama* within the framework of common national identity. This certainly affects not only the theological interpretation of God but also sociological explanations of God. At the sociological level, this interpretation of God as religious tolerance is based -among other things- on an argument that Pancasila is a way of constructing through symbols and rituals an ultimate meaning and direction for religious activity of “all religions” and not of a particular religion. Nonetheless, although we interpret God as religious tolerance the fact remains that social images can have theological relevance in the same manner that theological image can have social and political relevance. When we interpret God as religious tolerance therefore, it shows that we think of religious tolerance as important thing as God. Similarly, when religious tolerance is described in Pancasila as *Belief in One God* it shows that religious tolerance is the ultimate religious value in Pancasila.

The second sila is humanitarianism, *Kemanusiaan yang Adil dan Beradab*, which means Just and Virtuous Humanitarianism. A commitment to this value entails a willingness to treat others in a fair manner, free from suspicion, exploitation and oppression. This value also reinforces the respect for the dignity of all people and their right to be free from physical and spiritual oppression. It recognises the equality of all individuals in terms of rights and responsibilities, without discrimination. The rights of individuals are respected as well as the rights of the community.

The third value is *Persatuan Indonesia*, Indonesian Unity. This is the principle of national unity which expresses a commitment to the unity of Indonesia. It is in this value that the concept of nationalism, unity and integrity of the vast and

diverse island nation is embodied. This value puts the interest of the nation as the common interest of all Indonesians above the interest of individuals or groups.

The fourth principle emphasises the idea of a people led by wise policies arrived at through a process of consultation and consensus (*Kerakyatan yang Dipimpin oleh Hikmat Kebijaksanaan dalam Permusyawaratan/Perwakilan*). This principle means that Pancasila calls for democracy uniquely through mutual deliberation to reach consensus, whereby the majority always have to take into consideration and respect the needs of the minority.<sup>30</sup>

The fifth principle expresses a commitment to social justice for all Indonesians, *Keadilan Social bagi Seluruh Rakyat Indonesia*, Social Justice for All Indonesian citizens. This principle is concerned with an equitable society in which the fruits of economic development could be enjoyed by everybody including the poor.

By looking at these five principles one can easily see that the Pancasila's values have something for everyone. They are an articulation of inclusive norms in which the various members of other systems of norms can easily accept them jointly. They are in other words, oriented toward -what Parsons called- *collective gratification*. Moreover, they appeal constructively to Indonesians to build a nation based on harmonious values. Ultimately, Pancasila is not only to be thought of as a system of integration (Moerdiono 1996, 40-3) but also as a system that is designed to achieve an ultimate end. This end is: that Pancasila is devised to guide people

---

<sup>30</sup> We are not concerned here with the notion of how Pancasila defines democracy or what kind of democracy Pancasila follows. Suffice to say is that Pancasila democracy is understood in terms of Soeharto's democracy. It is not liberal democracy but is what they call a "Guided Democracy", which technically means a dictated democracy. Guided Democracy also means that Soeharto has an absolute rule to dictate his people and abuse his power.

towards the achievement of a just, prosperous, and blissful society (Poespowardoyo 1996, 45). Talking about the notion of the integration of norms, insofar as these ultimate ends are concerned, the integration as well as the relation between members of the community is understandable in terms of the five values of Pancasila.

In essence, the system of Pancasila is associated particularly with the notion of mutual assistance or what is commonly known as *gotong royong*. In terms of the latter, the system of Pancasila orients the objects in terms of mutual expectations. The essential property of such co-operation is mutuality of orientation defined in terms of shared patterns of normative cultural system of Pancasila. Ideally therefore, these patterns of Pancasila bring about the integration of the existing groups like a series of interlocking wheels.

Perhaps it is necessary to trace further the notion of *gotong royong*, since it is - to a large extent- the heart and the essence of Pancasila (Alfian 1996, 221). Pancasila is connected with *gotong royong* and capitalises on it as an ideal and important principle in human relations and national life. It is more in *gotong royong* that common endeavour, mutual help, and understanding in national life is to be understood.

Gotong royong literally means mutual assistance but its most basic meaning is that of social harmony and identity of interest which relates cosmic harmony and which is achieved by specific acts of co-operation. It is originally a value of the Indonesian village. In traditional Java the term *gotong royong* is based on an old Indonesian norm which demands consumptive interdependence and support on a family basis (Kahane 1973, 24). From a structural point of view it emphasises the broad family in which every member shares this output with other members of the



family. It was introduced as the most important element of Pancasila by Sukarno. Sukarno himself was born in the small village near the town of Blitar, East Java, and therefore he must have been shaped by the village order and intermarried its patterns and rhythms. The village way of life is indeed an important ingredient of Sukarno's thought and thus constitutes the most precious component of Pancasila (Alfian 1996, 201).

The Indonesian villages are a closed society. Individuals are members of the village. Their freedom of action is restricted in every way by the rule of the community. A person is part of a community as a whole. The collective not the individual element predominates in the communal ethos. The village society is characterised with communal consciousness with its emphasis on collective action (Van der Kroef 1954, 96). The collective pattern of behaviour provides a haven in which the individual almost gladly submerges him/herself. The village is a co-operative enterprise where communal rights to the village resources traditionally take precedence over individual rights. Almost everywhere in the villages the concept of mutual assistance is strongly developed. This co-operative characteristic is not only a feature of an economic and social relationship, it is also basic to a pattern of religious relationship, communication and exchange. (Van der Kroef 1954, 98). These village's general set of values, the total pattern of values and the life-style of the village are the main components of the so-called *gotong royong*.

Collectivist structure of village society is the original form of the village and peasant civilisation of Indonesia long before all other civilisations came. Historically the Indonesian village society constituted the basis of indigenous civilisation in the archipelago. When Hinduism/Buddhism arrived, the traditions of mutual assistance,

preferences of communal interests over individual one's, were strengthened. By the time Islam spread in the archipelago with its egalitarian doctrine the communalistic bases had become even more unshakeable, thanks to the communalistic aspects of the teaching of Islam.

It is worth noting that the tenets of Indonesian collectivism stress the unbroken relationship between the group and the individual. The latter has rights in terms of the former and the former exists to give the latter meaning. For the Indonesians there was traditionally no cleavage between the individual and the collectivity because of the supremacy of a monistic worldview, which fuses the microcosmos of the individual or humankind with the macrocosmos of the divine universe (Van der Kroef 1954, 101).

Perhaps it is fair to argue that the notion of gotong-royong was considered to be the most important element of Pancasila. Pancasila without gotong royong would be less realistic. As a value therefore, gotong royong is very useful to Pancasila as it represents the traditional element of the value system of Indonesia. It stresses more emphatically the Pancasila's concern about the importance of a mutually-oriented normative order. It also directs individual to change their moral personalities and requires a new type of individual. Further, it enjoins that an individual's motivation must be altered from egocentrism into selflessness and togetherness. By gotong royong therefore, solidarity among the members of the society is expected to be easily found.

The above was an exposition of Pancasila at the level of an "evaluative system", a system of religious and moral conceptions embodied in its five principles. Now we turn to Pancasila as symbolic system.

## II. Pancasila as Symbolic System

As a cultural system Pancasila, besides being supplied by normative values, is also equipped with a sacred symbol, the bird of Garuda Pancasila. In this chapter we deal with that national symbol of Garuda Pancasila.

Called Garuda, this symbol consists of a golden eagle and carries a shield with the five symbols of Pancasila on it. The five symbols exemplify the five values of Pancasila. The shield symbolises self-defence in struggle and protection of the country and oneself. The background colours of the shield is red and white and denote the colours of the Indonesian flag. The five symbols on the shield that exemplify the five values of Pancasila are: the Golden Star which amplifies the first principle of Belief in One God. The second symbol, the Chain, symbolises the second principle of a Just and Civilised Humanity. The *Beringin*, or banyan tree represents the third value, that of Indonesian Unity. The fourth symbol, the Bull's Head, represents the fourth sila of Democracy, and the fifth symbol, the Gold and white Paddy symbolises social justice (Dahlan 1996, 25-6).

The second sila, Just and Civilised Humanity is exemplified by the Chain because the chain symbolises mutual assistance toward others physically and organically. The third sila, Indonesian Unity is represented by the *Beringin*, because the tree symbolises a feeling of identification with collectivities. The fourth sila, Democracy is represented by the head of the bull because it symbolises the reciprocity toward other personalities. The most important sila, Belief in One God is represented by the golden star because it symbolises the attitudes toward religious freedom and tolerance.

The bird Garuda also holds a banner by its talons in which another important national symbol, or rather national slogan, is located, viz. the slogan of national unity within national diversity. It is the national motto of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, which means Unity in Diversity. Originated from twelfth-century Buddhist-Javanese text of *Nagarakratagama*,<sup>31</sup> *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* is designed essentially alike to that of the American motto of *Et Pluribus Unum*.

Garuda is a mythical bird. It is a symbol of strength and creative energy. The principle gold colour of Garuda Pancasila suggests the greatness of the nation. It consists of 17 feathers on each wing, 8 on the tail and 45 on the neck which stands for the date of Indonesia's proclamation of independence on 17th of August, 1945.

The significance of this symbol however rests in its religious origin. It originated from the religious Indian Garuda, in the same way that the "five" principles of Pancasila originated from the Himayana Pancha-sila, namely a set of Javanised Buddhists principles, mentioned in one of the oldest preserved Buddhist-Javanese literary texts, the *Nagarakratagama* (Anderson 1990, 146).

Historically, Garuda is a religiously sacred bird not only in Indonesia but also in many other places. In India for example, the bird Garuda is seen as a sacred bird. It is a mythical bird whose name means "devotee". It is a Vishnu vehicle (Vahana) and the emblem of his flagstaff. H.H Penner narrates the story of the birth and its deeds as told in the Mahabrata as follows: "...Breaking the shell of his egg, he immediately grew to his giant size and flew into the atmosphere. The gods awed at his brilliance, sang his praise. Garuda eventually kills the great snakes who are

---

<sup>31</sup> *Nagarakratagama* is also the main source of the history of Majapahit kingdom. It was written in the time of Hayam Wuruk's reign. According to *Nagarakratagama*, Majapahit claimed a form of authority over far-flung vassal states throughout Sumatra, the Malaysian Peninsula, Kalimantan and eastern Indonesia.

protecting the elixir of immortality and steals the elixir from the snakes and gods. Flying upward with the elixir he encounters Vishnu and requests two boons: that he, Garuda, will always be above Vishnu and that without drinking the elixir he will never age or die. Vishnu grants the wish. In return Garuda grants Vishnu a boon. Vishnu requests that Garuda become his mount. The request is granted....” (1981, 274).

In Tibetan Buddhism, the Garuda is believed not only to be the mount of Vishnu but also his wife's, Lakshmi. Moreover, it is seen as a sun symbol and lived on a diet of *nagas* (snakes) the ultimate creatures of the earth. It is also believed to be the vehicle of Vajrapani, the symbol of the transcendent Buddha Amoghasiddhi. In Tibetan Buddhism, Garuda played an important role because of his similarity to the mythical Himalayan *khyung* bird. Four bull-horned *khyung* protected the four directions and a *khyung* appeared in the company of mountain spirits in the sacred dances of the Bon, the indigenous, pre-Buddhist religion of Tibet. With his heavenly associations and his sworn enmity to the evil forces of the earth, Garuda appealed to Mongolian Buddhists as a logical character for their own version of the *tsam*. In the Mongolian *tsam*, Garuda plays the role of one of the Lords of the Four Mountains. It represents the Shamanistic Lord of Bogdo Ula, the sacred mountain south of modern Ulaanbaatar.<sup>32</sup>

Returning to our discussion on Pancasila, the question remains: To what extent does the symbol of Garuda of the Pancasila play a role in the process of integrating the conflicting systems and norms in Indonesia? As a primary answer to the question

---

<sup>32</sup> *Garuda: Spirit of Bogdo Ula*. The Asian Art Museum, Choijin-Lama Temple Museum, Mongolian Exhibition. <http://www.asianart.com/mongolia/garuda>. (No author mentioned)

let me simply argue that Garuda Pancasila, can (1) aid in communication between the three cognitive-discriminative social systems of the santri, priyayi, abangan, and of course other groups and parties such as ethnically-oriented political parties. 2) Regulate the interaction between them, and 3) serve directly to gratify religious needs and symbolically give a religious meaning to the life of the people, thanks to its religious origin. Being the national symbol, the role the Garuda Pancasila plays in domesticating the religiously conflicting society is like a "mother's response to her child while crying". The mother's response to her child helps in relieving the child's distress and at the same time accommodates the child's need for a mother.

If that is the case -and that is truly the case as we will show below- then the symbolic system of Garuda Pancasila is very important. It is no less important than its counterpart of the evaluative system of Pancasila. However, Parsons as cited by Peacock (1976, 265) argued that symbol is less determinant than value for the purpose of social integration. That is to say, that when a society is at stake, evaluative arrangement rather than symbolic culture and value necessarily come to the fore and play the more determinant role, according to Parsons. Parsons is not correct I believe in arguing so. Yes, it is true that symbols by comparison to values are less binding in a legal sense on its participants ramified spheres of life. It seems convincingly certain for example, that Islamic law shapes the form of Muslim families, while the Ka'bah, the most important religious symbol of Islam, does not. However, this does not necessarily mean that symbol is less important for the wider society or that it has less control over behaviour. Symbol must have a power in social patterning through the medium of the personality and by subtle psychological routes. Parsons in this sense is traditional and mechanistic. In reality, the symbolic system of Pancasila comes and

plays a role hand in hand with its evaluative system. They are at the same degree as far as integrating the various norms is concerned. Thus, when the five values of Pancasila were institutionalised, symbolic attitudes of the Garuda surrounded these values. Evaluative values of Pancasila become important and substantial only when equipped with the symbolic system of the Garuda.

To really appreciate the importance of symbol in general and the symbolic system of Garuda Pancasila in particular, and to avoid the mechanistic explanation of Parsonian functionalism, one needs to look at the conception of symbol provided by Geertz. Geertz's rationale of symbolic systems was aimed at challenging the analytic machinery of Parson's functionalism by forcing it to operate within the constraints of the symbolic order. Geertz's symbolism shares with Parsons' functionalism though, certain assumptions. They share for example, in their conception of culture. It is from Parsons' conception of culture that Geertz developed the concept of symbol. Parsons' conception of culture consists of two levels, namely value and symbol. However, the starting point of Geertz's explanation of symbolism and its articulation with reality is Parsons' framework of culture (Karathe 1988, 55). However, while Geertz was influenced by Parsons, he differs with Parsons in that, while Parsons seemed to ignore the importance of symbolic system, Geertz seemed to put more stress on it. In addition, while Parsons seemed to incorporate the notion of symbol within the notion of culture, Geertz seemed to formulate the notion of symbol as a relatively autonomous system that can be studied in its own right.

Yet, Geertz's ramification of symbols is conditioned by his desire to reproduce Talcott Parsons' conception of culture by emphasising more on the notion of symbol. Geertz's definition of culture for example, is a refinement of Parsons' definition. He

defined culture as “an ordered system of meaning and symbols, in terms of which social interaction takes place” (Geertz 1966, 57). And he elucidated cultural activity as “...an activity in which symbolism forms the positive content (Geertz 1966, 58). Parsons though understood culture as merely a system which is specifically concerned with systems of meaning (Parsons 1973, 36). Most importantly, Geertz’s “Religion as a Cultural System” seemed to be a proposal to expand the conceptual envelope of the cultural dimension, as mapped out by Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils (1951). His proposal is that we need to treat symbols as forming patterns that “model” relations among entities, processes or what-have-you in physical, organic, social, or psychological systems, by ‘paralleling,’ ‘imitating’, or ‘stimulating’ them (Geertz 1966, 59). The symbolic order runs parallel to and expresses or represents social and psychological processes that occur in the “real world”. According to this analogy, symbols are mirrors of real social events. He conceives symbols as possessing a material or corporal aspect that can embody meaning and a meaningful aspect that is embodied in the corporeality of the symbol. He defines symbol as “any object, act, event, quality, or relation which serves as a vehicle for a conception- namely the symbol’s meaning (Geertz 1966, 58). Thus, if the system of evaluative value provides meaning, the system of symbol provides a conception, namely the meaning of symbol in Geertz’s account. This implies as far as Pancasila is concerned, that Pancasila with its two systems of value and symbol is actually meaningful to the survival of the society on the grounds that matters important to the integration and survival of society as a whole must be controlled by the mechanisms of an evaluative system and symbolic order.



The point to be emphasised here is that symbolic system is not less important than value system. On the contrary, a value system in some instances is more problematic and thus less determinant than a symbolic system. The first value of Pancasila for example, *Belief in One God*, is often considered by Muslims as being repugnant because it uses the word Tuhan instead of Allah. It thus arouses Muslim resistance. At this point the value of Pancasila has one type of control more indecisive than that of the symbol of Garuda. Simultaneously, the symbol of Garuda I assume, can help -thanks to its religious quality and origin- anchor the new national identity by symbolically converting it into "faith". Here faith is a source of stability and integration because all critical elements of humankind are touched in some important manner by faith. Faith is also a means whereby people together identify themselves, organise their community, find meaning for their sentiments, and express their beliefs and identity. Through the Garuda then, people can express symbolically their religious faith, sentiment, belief and identity.

Apart from whether symbol is more determinant than value or vice versa, Pancasila at its two levels is common, inclusive, and overarching faith that transcends the more primordial faith. Both the symbol of Garuda and the values of Pancasila constitute this faith. They both together bestow "religious" meaning and conception in the sense that: firstly, they symbolise a religious emotion and secondly they subsume religious experiences by uniting symbolically the image of the existence of God (in the formation of the sacred bird, Garuda) with the conception of Monotheistic God expressed in the first value of Pancasila, *Belief in One God*. By doing so Pancasila has indeed initiated an adjustment between religious primordial ties by

which religious interaction can proceed freely without seriously threatening the religious framework of private religious identity.

The political implication of Pancasila being endowed with “religious” meaning is that the state is now elevated to the level of a ‘religiously’ legitimate state.

### **III. Anti-Pancasila Movements**

Although Pancasila has elevated the state into a “religiously” legitimate state, the question remains; Legitimate for who? It is important to note that despite the fact that “Belief in One God” expresses a religious emotion and maintains a profoundly rooted “consciousness of a religious kind”, it remains a source of social, political and religious discord. One of the possible reasons is that it is perhaps too general and thus allows any particular religion to continue to claim that its religious belief has not been expressed in it.

Radical santri Muslim and the abangan were among those to dispute the Pancasila and its first value. For the santri, as we have said, the unacceptability of the first value lies in its usage of the word *Tuhan* instead of Allah. And for the abangan, the Pancasila is unacceptable because the abangans were antithetical to every existing social and political *status quo*, including Pancasila.

Pancasila thus set another stage for a direct clash between private religious individuality and the common national identity. It simplified a new level of religious antagonism and raised a new spectre of primordial separatism. Hence, it still failed to become a common kind of identity during at least three decades after it had been founded, a time during which various rebellions against Pancasila emerged. The most serious rebellions were the *Darul Islam* revolts between 1948 and 1962, and the

Communist-abangan G30 S/PKI, *Gerakan 30 September PKI*, A Revolt of September 30th, 1965.

A series of Islamic-inspired armed uprisings emerged in West-Java, South Sulawesi, and Aceh. In West Java it began in 1948, three years after the announcement of Pancasila. Backed by the military unit of the Hizbullah, it proclaimed an independent Islamic state in the Priangan West Java under the leadership of Kartosuwirjo (1905-62) and vowed to continue the armed struggle against Pancasila. By the year 1950's the Islamic revolt had spread to South Sulawesi and Aceh. In South Sulawesi the Darul Islam was led by Kahar Muzakkar (1921-65) from 1951 to 1961. In Aceh, a town in the island of Sumatra the Darul Islam was led by Tengku Daud Beureuh (1900-87), a leading Acehnese religious figure from 1953 to 1961. Daud Beureuh from 1947 was military governor of the province of north Sumatra including Aceh. Two years later, he demanded formal recognition of Aceh as a separate province. In early 1953 when Sukarno visited Aceh, Daud made it more clear that he refused Pancasila and wanted Islam. In September 1953 he proclaimed Aceh's secession from the Republic of Indonesia and its adherence to the Indonesian Islamic State of the Darul Islam (Cribb 1995, 38, 40-1). The revolt in Aceh was the greatest among the santri's revolts as the Acehnese were renowned for the strength of their devotion to Islam.

Sukarno realising that the santris were anti-Pancasila, commenced not only military operations against them but also banned their strongest and largest Islamic political party, Masjumi in 1960s.

Meanwhile, during the 1950's the threat of the communist abangan had also grown. On 30 September/1 October 1965 the danger of the communists was

culminating in their attempt to overthrow the government through a *coup d'état*. This was thought to be the most hideous rebellion against Pancasila in the history of Indonesia. Six senior military commanders were abducted and assassinated, half a million civilians died, and hundreds of thousands were imprisoned.<sup>33</sup>

The communist tendency of revolt against Pancasila had begun in fact, as early as 1948 when it was involved in the anti-Pancasila rising in the city of Madiun in East Java. Despite the government's attempt to ban it, Communism continued to survive, thanks to the tactic of promoting the formation of a united national front including the national bourgeoisie (Cribb 1995, 55). The breadth of this national front reflected the communist view that Pancasila had indeed freed the country politically from colonial domination, but had not freed it from the economic colonialism which was represented in the continuing dominance of the economy by non-indigenous capital both Chinese and European.

In dealing with the anti-Pancasila revolts both from the radical santri and abangan, Sukarno took the initiative of bringing Pancasila in line with the ideal of national life. The ingredients of this climacteric surge in order to pass Pancasila as the national identity were, building one of the world's largest mosques, the national mosque Istiqlaal, building a colossal sports stadium, a national monument of Monas which is higher than the Eiffel Tower, together with a flood of slogans, catchwords, proclamations and so on. In an attempt to ideologically domesticate these rebellions

---

<sup>33</sup> According to the official version of Soeharto's regime, Soeharto was the one that cracked down the coup attempt. He was major general and then Chief of the Army's Strategic Command. However, after Soeharto's downfall there has been an allegation by one of the former senior official that Soeharto had knowledge about the plot to overthrow the government. This implies that Soeharto might have been involved in the notorious coup attempt.

and balance the contending forces of *santri*, *abangan*, and *priyayi*, Sukarno advocated another symbol besides Pancasila, a concept known as “NASAKOM” (an acronym formed from *Nasionalisme*, the ideology of *priyayi*; *Agama* literally means religion and refers to *santri*’s ideology; and *Komunisme*, the philosophy of *abangan*) in the 1960s.<sup>34</sup> The concept of Nasakom hence, referred to a unity of nationalism, religion, and communism, and merged the representatives of the main powers in Indonesia. Not long after it was founded though, Nasakom dissolved in 1969’s for one reason; because the idealism of Nasakom was too alien to the common people of Indonesia (Moerdiono 1996, 386).

Thus Pancasila together with its duplicate Nasakom still couldn’t be fully welcomed in a concrete society. This fact was coupled with the national solidarity being faded. The political *status quo* had deteriorated, whereas the political rebellions strengthened. The political equilibrium was missing and the nation became like a classic case of integrative failure. Every step towards passing Pancasila as a national identity only increased “ideological” discontent. With each increase in ideological discontent a new revelation of political incapacity was promoted, and with each new revelation of political incapacity, political nerve and a more disparate resort to an unstable amalgam of military coercion was only encouraged. The society was now completely at stake. The first general elections of 1955 further stirred the already deteriorating situation. It even shifted the central gravity of Pancasila when the most hostile party to Pancasila, the *abangan*’s PKI, strengthened. The party gained some

---

<sup>34</sup> It was during this period too that Sukarno echoed his notorious doctrine of *marhaenism*. The *marhaen* is the little man, the peasant or the proletariat. Sukarno loved to discuss politics in his speeches in terms of a legendary “papa” *marhaen*, an old man who is the distillation of peasant wisdom, and whose thought, emotions, and wishes Sukarno purported to understand very well.

16 percent of the total vote and drew nearly 90 percent of its support from Java.<sup>35</sup> The abangan position was further fortified by the fact that in 1956 Muhammad Hatta the vice president to Sukarno resigned, a move that in essence was a political setback so far as the priyayi and perhaps the santri were concerned. Hatta, was part of the priyayi faith but was sympathetic to the santri faith in the same way that Sukarno belonged to Pancasila but was sympathetic to the abangan. Being radical and now become -to some extent- the axis of Indonesian life, the abangan caused the religious and political balance to be upset. The advance toward religious disaffection entered its radical phase. Violence alternated with a frantic search for political panaceas. Abortive coups and misfired assassination attempts followed one after the other.

Despite all of this, the Sukarno years witnessed a proud invention of Pancasila, and a proud contrivance of Nasakom. However, events which culminated in the military coup have shown that the function of Pancasila and Nasakom was limited. They did not operate quite effectively from 1945 until 1965. No strong integrative outcome had resulted and they almost ripped the nation apart. By the end of 1965 both mechanisms of Pancasila and Nasakom could not regulate and balance the antagonistic society.<sup>36</sup> The situation had constantly deteriorated. The country was

---

speeches in terms of a legendary "papa" marhaen, an old man who is the distillation of peasant wisdom, and whose thought, emotions, and wishes Sukarno purported to understand very well.

<sup>35</sup> In 1948, PKI was already on the verge of making the most spectacular comeback of its chequered history after two decades (it was founded in 1924) of the leadership crisis. In an internal contest which ended in January 1951 the youthful leadership of Aidit, Lukman, Njoto and Sudisman took control of the party. From the beginning Aidit insisted that Marxism was a guide to action not an inflexible dogma. His leadership brought a new pragmatism to PKI which enabled it shortly to become one of the largest political parties. PKI's base was primarily among urban and agricultural estate workers, who were organised through the union federation SOBSI (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, All Indonesia's Workers' Organisation Centre). Later the party was to expand to other sectors of society, including the peasantry. See, (Ricklefs 1993, 241).

<sup>36</sup> *Memerangi Ideologi, Memonopoli Kekuasaan*. Forum On-line, <http://www.forum.co.id>. August 1998. Also Soedjatmoko, in his Introduction to *An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography*, mentioned that in this particular time the sense of Indonesian individuality had weakened, without mentioning the failure of Pancasila and Nasakom as the national symbols. He also mentioned that those circumstances had led the nation to search for the clearer definition of national identity. See (Soedjatmoko 1965, xi).

convulsed with violence and unbridled rage in which hundreds of thousands were slaughtered, cut down in their homes, in their villages and in congested city alleys. Following this uncontrollable worsening situation, Sukarno departed in 1968. This violence carried an empathic, horrific and incontrovertible message: Sukarno's dream of unifying a fractious populace of Islamist *santri*, Nationalist *priyayi*, and Communist *abangan* by the force of Pancasila and Nasakom had been a mirage, fantasy and colossal miscalculation. Sukarno, together with Nasakom thus finally collapsed. Interestingly though, Pancasila survived. It had not declined although it suffered from major legitimacy problems and almost lost its confidence.

The next attempt to reconstruct and pass Pancasila as the common national identity was done by Soeharto -the direct successor to Sukarno- through the mechanism of ritualisation of Pancasila.

#### **IV. Ritualisation of Pancasila**

By the time Soeharto came to power in March 1968 he was forced to establish stable authority in an extraordinarily unstable time, a time where intense decades-long rivalries between *santri*, *abangan*, and *priyayi* had come to a head in a ferocious orgy of violence.

The chaos resulting in those days could be the reflection of the contrast between the ideals and the cosmos pictured in Pancasila and the real situation in the real life. However, Pancasila's ideals and cosmos remained -and still remain- relevant. They are concerned with the notion of unification and the notion of a common national identity. Pancasila was furthermore designed to be a meeting place between various trends and norms that each member in the society could supposedly

partially identify with without abolishing their own particularistic symbol and identity. It was meant to be an all-encompassing philosophy of life.

Soeharto's task was thus not to change these ideals and cosmos of Pancasila. His task was rather to ideologically reconstruct contrivances to bring Pancasila closer to reality and reinforce mechanisms by which the sacredness of Pancasila could be strengthened. What I mean by reality is social, economic, political and particularly religious conditions of Indonesian society.

In order to bring Pancasila closer to reality, Pancasila was then brought to centre on the development of three aspects. On the political level it centred on the development of a single system of central authority through a single party<sup>37</sup>, Golkar. On the economic level it centred on the material development of the country, and on the "religious" level it centred on the ritualisation of Pancasila. All three are intimately connected as a process of bringing Pancasila closer to reality and reinforcing its sacredness (Mubyarto 1996/239-248, Swasono 1996/249-283, Tjokroamidjojo 1996/309-325).

On the economic level not much can be said except to admit that the President Soeharto's government indeed succeeded in transforming the country from the poor and stagnant country it took over in 1966 into a dynamic and steadily developing one, before bringing it back into poverty.

On the political level, great emphasis has been put on the centrality of Pancasila as the ideological basis of Indonesian nationhood. It was then turned into ideology expressed through the mechanism of the "single" party, the Golkar. This

---

<sup>37</sup> There were three parties in Soeharto's time, namely PPP, *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*, The Unity and Development Party. PDI, *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*, Indonesian Democracy Party. And Soeharto's party Golkar. In practice it was only Golkar that functioned as a party, while the other two were intentionally circumscribed, and politically dead.



party is designed together with the ABRI, *Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*, The Defence Force of the Republic of Indonesia, as the defenders of Pancasila.

On the “religious” level Pancasila centred on ritualisation both in ceremonies and thought. In order to be ritualised, or rather consecrated in thought, Pancasila was invested with the aspect of sacredness, namely the *kesaktian* (the Javanese notion of super-powerfulness, divinity, and sacredness). Thus Pancasila from the 1970’s was called Pancasila-Sakti,<sup>38</sup> the super-powerful, divine, and sacred Pancasila. Once a year on the Day of *Kesaktian* Pancasila, September 30, Pancasila is sanctified. Historically it is called sakti because it is believed to be the saviour of the state and the nation from the danger of the Communism and as such, from the notorious 30 September 1965 coup attempt by the communists.

The sacredness and immortality of Pancasila are thus institutionalised. It had indeed become a sacred reality, considered by the nation as sacred (Wibisono 1998, 1) and hence deemed to be “separated” from all that is “profane”. Officially it is not as vulgar or drab as any other identity or ideology.

The notion of *sakti* or *kesaktian* is an ancient Javanese concept. In the old Javanese tradition there must always be a ruler under whose leadership stability, security, and prosperity are maintained and all political entities are combined in a coherent unity. This ruler must be *sakti* or has *kesakten* and must be treated as sacred if the process of combining all political entities and maintaining stability, security,

---

<sup>38</sup> Besides being called *sakti*, Pancasila is also being associated with the Army doctrine of *Tri Ubaya Cakti*, which literally means the three super-powerful formulas. This doctrine emerged in 1965 in Bandung, not long after Pancasila “saved” the country from the deadly coup attempt by the communists. This Sanskrit formula is not without significance since its symbolism invokes in the mind of its Javanese beholder traditional notion of power. Tri means three, and cakti or sakti means super-powerful. The three formulas are, 1) The doctrine of Basic National Security, 2) The Doctrine of civil action, and 3) The doctrine of development. See (Gunn 1979, 754)

and prosperity of the state are to succeed (Anderson 1990, 25). A striking illustration of this is the word *Buwana*, which means world, and *alam* which means universe. These two words have been used since 1705 by the rulers of the Javanese Kingdom of Mataram (Anderson 1990, 45) and are still used until today by the descendants of the kings that still exist in the town of Yogyakarta, e.g. Paku Buwana (Pivot of the world), Hamengkubuwana (Sustainer of the world), and Paku Alam (Pivot of the Universe). By attributing these titles of *buwana* and *alam* they are assumed to be super-powerful and sacred and accordingly the requisite mimesis which binds them and the people is achieved by this mystique which historically was reinforced by the myth that the king was literally sacred, super-powerful and divine. Besides the kings of Mataram other early Javanese leaders such as Ken Arok of the 13th century, Gadjah Mada of the 14th century, and Panembahan Senopati of the 16th century also used the titles of *kesakten*. Even Sukarno and Soeharto were believed to have *kesakten* or at least have something/someone *sakti* to protect them.<sup>39</sup> However, since Soeharto came to power this quality of *kesakten* was attributed to Pancasila officially by calling it Pancasila-Sakti.

Ideological indoctrination has been a powerful instrument in making Pancasila sanctified in thought. This ideological indoctrination is known as P4 -*Pedoman Pengamalan dan Penghayatan Pancasila*- (Formula for the Cognisance and Implementation of Pancasila). Having been approved by the People's Consultative Assembly's decision on 22 March 1978, this indoctrination is organised throughout the archipelago. Under this program it is compulsory for all students below university

---

<sup>39</sup> It is common knowledge among Indonesians that Soeharto did have what we call *Dukun* (a supernatural man) who claims to have knowledge about the invisible world.

level to take subject on Pancasila, known as *Pendidikan Moral Pancasila* (PMP), the Education of Pancasila's Morality, whose texts are a blend of ideology and theology and somehow mixtures of mysticism and pragmatism. The texts are meant to provide guidance for moral conduct and help define an individual's relationship to the state. The norms of egalitarianism, mutual relationship, and mass participation in social life are also expressed in the texts.

Students of university level are also obliged to attend two-week upgrading courses before they can commence their studies. All state officials, civil servants (Korpri, *Korp Pegawai Negeri Indonesia*, Corporation of Civil Servant of Indonesia) and their wives (Dharma Wanita, Good Women) are required to attend the courses at certain times. Through these courses everyone are brainwashed in such a way that they will inculcate an ethos of unquestioning obedience and acceptance of the Pancasila hierarchy. Korpri and Dharma Wanita have no way out but to "worship" Pancasila as their lives are dependent on the state. They are completely dictated. They must wear uniform to go to their offices and above all they must constantly show their adherence and "monoloyalty" to the Pancasila. Their offices, even in the isolated rural areas, must display the picture of Garuda Pancasila in between the picture of the president and the vice-president.

Having been invested and identified with the sacred, and after all, being considered as sacred, Pancasila is now to be ritually devoted. Certainly, the experience of sacredness could not emerge from routine or everyday interaction, it must emerge from rituals or ceremonies. Once a week therefore, members of Korpri and Dharma Wanita must attend a seemingly ritual parade to declare their loyalty to Pancasila. Students below university level are also required to attend a weekly

Monday morning ceremony in uniform and parade in a seemingly ritualistic service. They sing the national anthem of Indonesia Raya (Great Indonesia) and pronounce together the five principles of Pancasila to announce their devotion to the faith of Pancasila. The ritual to sanctify Pancasila continues throughout the year. The annual ritual of Independence Day, 17 August is also held.

One probably could speculate whether Pancasila's ceremonies are ritual or not, or whether they are religious or secular. The answer to that is that here I am not concerned with the ceremonies or rituals of Pancasila being religious or secular, for what is important in these rituals and ceremonies is not the supernatural idiom. I have been rather concerned with the more crucial issue, i.e. the effects these rituals have in the process of sacralising and fostering Pancasila, and thus promoting stability and integration. Since Pancasila functions like religion -although it is not religion as such (Wahid 1996, 166), its rituals function the way religious rituals do. However, being closely affiliated with a sacred thing and taken for granted to be "immutable", Pancasila does resemble religion and only differs with it in degree not in kind. While religion for example, has mystical and supernatural transcendence, Pancasila has its roots in religious myth and has elements of transcendental ideals. Pancasila has mysticism, symbol as well as authority like religion. Both Pancasila and religion involve a system of value, a system to which the allocation of good and bad, right and wrong is relevant. Above all, both religion and Pancasila have mechanisms of ritual. To sanctify Pancasila for example, students, members of Korpri and Dharma Wanita are obliged to display manners that are typical of sectarian behaviour: the surrender of their individuality to the Pancasila cause. However, while the ritual of Pancasila is essentially rational, the ritual of religion is non-rational. While the ritual of religion is

more religiously constructed and therefore more immutable, the ritual of Pancasila is more consciously socially constructed and therefore less immutable.

Now, how do the rituals of Pancasila contribute to and function in the process of stability and integration in the society. Geertz has given a brilliant explanation as to how rituals can contribute to the process of stability and integration in a society. In his seminal article “Religion as Cultural System”, he states that “a religion is a system of symbol which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic (1966, 4). It is in ritual, he continues, or “cultural performances” in his term, that the moods and motivations which sacred symbol induce in men, and the general conceptions of the order of existence which they formulate for men, meet and reinforce one another (1966, 66).

Now, since Pancasila is seen to be the highest form of a system of symbol (as well as a system of value), it has to be “religiously” ritualised if its moods and motivations are to be accomplished.

Politically Pancasila is to be ritualised too and seen as the sole political “religion” of the whole nation. Thus it became the sole ideological basis for any political party in the country. To make sure that Pancasila in its regular working and development as the sole political religion worked smoothly, Soeharto in 1982 officially disposed a policy that forced all social, religious, and political organisations to adopt Pancasila as their only ideological basis. This doctrine is called *Asas*

*Tunggal*,<sup>40</sup> and was coupled with the slogan of *Manusia Indonesia Seutuhnya Berdasarkan Pancasila*, which literally means “a perfect Indonesian man on the basis of Pancasila”. This slogan could technically mean that it is only through Pancasila that a “perfect man” can be created, and as long as a man is not a Pancasila-ist, he is not perfect.

Soeharto stressed that Pancasila is the only identity of the nation. He also warned that the existence of any alternative identity apart from Pancasila would be illegitimate. Organisations that refused to adopt Pancasila in their bylaws, constitutions, or charter were illegitimate (Alfian 1996, 206) and banned by the government. By so doing, Pancasila had indeed become successful in promoting political stability. But on the side of the coin, by being forced as *Asas Tunggal* coupled with the mechanism of a “single” party, Pancasila was turned into a monopolistic system. Within it, the government developed new monopolistic political policies and doctrines in keeping with which political pluralism was seen as not only dangerous, but also as challenging Pancasila and the legitimacy of Soeharto’s regime. The left and the right, namely the Communists (mostly *abangan*) and the Islamists (namely the radical *santris*) were deemed as a potential threat to Pancasila as well as to the national unity. They had been excluded from the mainstream of ideological consensus from the beginning of Soeharto’s regime. They were -albeit in a different way- excluded and deprived from any kind of economic, political, or social activities. This highly arbitrary rule was further extended in the late 1980s by a regulation discriminating against particularly the children of parents who had been or might have

---

<sup>40</sup> After the downfall of Soeharto the *Asas Tunggal* has come under scrutiny. As such, the question of whether the *Asas Tunggal* should still be regarded as the sole ideological basis for any political party has been once again debated. Up till now there has been no result from the political debate.

been influenced by Communist-Marxist thinking. The santris, because of their refusal to accept the Pancasila's *Asas Tunggal* also suffered. Their refusal resulted in the incident of September 1984 Tanjung Priok, a port in North Jakarta, where five hundred people were reportedly killed. Two santri members of the Petition Fifty<sup>41</sup>, including retired Major General H.R. Dharsono and prominent Muslim preacher A.M. Fatwa were arrested on charges of trying to subvert Pancasila (Fatwa, 1995).

Thus, once having become *Asas Tunggal*, Pancasila became monopolistic, and when it became monopolistic, factors other than Pancasila, including pluralism in political belief, are all conspicuously absent and forbidden.

Besides Pancasila's undercut of the legitimacy of alternative ideologies, it also prevented public expression, ideas and opinions. Freedom of expression was strongly restricted. Criticising the government and the authority, particularly the president, and even a member of cabinet minister was a subversion. Dissent from official doctrine apart from Pancasila was seen as a source of discomfort. Students and intellectuals were strictly watched. Overt dissent was virtually silenced since 1980s not only by the government's broad powers of detention and its use of legal weapons to silence critics in the name of Pancasila, but also through the fear of being blacklisted or the denial of rights to travel abroad. Pancasila was thus used to "execute" a tradition of intellectual and civil rights. It was also used as a justification to subordinate the rights and wishes of individuals to those of the government's and most ridiculously, to that of Soeharto's own will. Pancasila was also driven by Soeharto as an ideological means to protect his and his family's hydra-like business interests. From a business

---

<sup>41</sup> Petition Fifty is an opposition group against Soeharto's regime. Its members are 50 in number, most of whom are significant and powerful figures whose support for Soeharto against Sukarno in the mid-1960s helped bring about the end of Sukarno.

point of view, Soeharto was more interested in the accumulation of wealth for his own pocket than in developing the country. Among his sons and daughters who were only in their twenties, had assembled fast-growing business empires and sizeable fortunes. Soeharto insisted that they were engaged in business for social and welfare-oriented ends. His eldest daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Hastuti Rukmana even suggested that her father's position was a hindrance to her business activities. The Soeharto family was acquiring control over the fastest growing and most lucrative areas of the country. All these were achieved by practices of monopoly, nepotism and corruption. In addition, there is no legislation governing these business empires for their exemption from tax and auditing. The scale of their enterprises was so great that scarcely any large project could proceed without the involvement of one of the family's business groups. Government ministers came under pressure to channel tenders and projects in their favour. Having all kinds of major business their greed remained extremely unlimited.

From a political point of view, there was no willingness on the part of Soeharto to make the country democratic and transparent. Young people particularly students and intellectuals were denied a chance to take initiatives.

Soeharto also rejected the notion of alternative candidates for the presidency. Officially, one tenth of the one thousand members of the MPR (*Majlis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*, People's Consultative Assembly) which elects the president was directly selected by him, while the rest were selected indirectly. All of them had to undergo a rigorous screening procedure. In most cases the members were not intellectually equipped since absolute and blind loyalty to the president rather than intellect was the political precondition for a person to be a member of the MPR. In



effect MPR members were not composed of elected representatives. The vocal people on the other hand were kept away from the politics often by force.

Soeharto's policies were hence converting Pancasila into a directly coercive mechanism that in turn did not have the effect of keeping the original value, meaning and purpose of Pancasila. In short, Soeharto contradicted the values, meaning and purpose of Pancasila.

## **Conclusion**

In his study of religious society, Durkheim proposed that every relatively stable society will possess a set of shared beliefs, values, and symbols that expresses the highest aspirations of the collectivity, and that are elevated to the level of transcendence, thereby becoming an integrative focus for members of the society (1976). Parallel to this, W. Lloyd Warner suggested that "complex societies must have a common core of basic understandings known and used by everyone or their complex and diverse symbolic superstructure will not stand. They need a general symbol system that everyone not only knows but feels" (1959, 4). Robbin Williams also suggested that "Every functioning society, to an important degree, have a common religion. The possession of a common set of ideas, rituals and symbols, he continues, can supply an overarching sense of unity" (1952).

Parsons, likely influenced by Durkheim's ideas of common religion, introduced the so-called common core or "value consensus", as he sometimes called it. Having determined at the theoretical level that a society needs value consensus, Parsons subsequently developed his theoretical framework by postulating the tri-

partite existence of an institutional system that entails a social system, cultural system, and personality system. The main focus of my thesis has been on the social and cultural systems.

Robert Bellah, Parsons' student, and strongly influenced by him, developed the notion of American Civil Religion. He found in the Parsonian "value consensus" the key to social solidarity. Thus he argued that any coherent and viable society rests upon a common set of moral understanding about good and bad, right and wrong, in the realm of individual and social action (1970/1975). His contribution to the value consensus is such that these common moral understandings must rest in turn upon a common set of religious understandings. In other words, the values must be transcendental. Besides Bellah, Clifford Geertz subsequently modified Parsons' framework of cultural system. While Geertz, consistent with Parsons, has focused much of his research attention on the importance of culture, he made implicitly one important insight, viz. the importance of symbolic conception.

I am therefore, in a good position to presume a basic dialectic between Parsons, Bellah, and Geertz, and marry their theoretical framework together. However, it is essentially those ideas of shared, transcendent values and symbol that bring our typology of Pancasila close to that of Parsons' value consensus, Bellah's American Civil Religion, and Geertz' s concept of symbol.

So far we have discussed Pancasila not only in terms of it being a shared value and symbol at metaphorical level, but also in terms of what might be called conceptual realism, namely Pancasila as a real entity rather than abstract, as a reality *sui generis*. It is a real entity because from the perspective of its specific meaning it provides moral and religious integration. Further, it is a real entity because it is an

attempt to construct by means of selective fashion of various existing norms, a new symbolic framework within which to give form, value and meaning to the nation.

To be effectively integrative, Pancasila incarnates religious norms and symbols that extend the capacity of Pancasila into a sacred “faith”. It evokes generalised sacred values and symbols in widely dissimilar religious groups and individuals. We have seen that at the level of value, Pancasila uses for example, a religious statement of *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*. This is in essence a common matrix of religious commitment which is broadly shared between various “denominations” and forms the basis of the sense in which the society as a whole form a religiously based moral community. It is a value that makes the meeting of santri Salvationism/Universalism, priyayi Populism, and revolutionary Abanganism possible. We, on the other hand, have seen that at the level of symbol Pancasila is invested with the geneologically sacred bird of Garuda. Here, sacralisation is the inevitable and indiscriminate process that accompanies Pancasila and thus there is a close affinity between Pancasila and sacralisation.

However, the association of Pancasila with the bird of Garuda is perhaps in agreement with the argument that a human society tends to adopt totemic animals as sacred symbols and that the totemic animal is treated with great veneration and circumspection (Durkheim 1976, 128-9).

Thus far, I have attempted to defend my thesis that Pancasila was devised to be the common national identity, and that as identity, Pancasila was/is undergoing a process of sacralisation, and the mechanism of the sacralisation consists mainly of ritual.

Now, as an identity Pancasila had been accepted as the property of the nation (Oesman 1996, 1). Intrinsically, Pancasila did somehow provide an answer to the biggest problem the nation ever had, namely a sense of one identity, togetherness and oneness. I am not saying that Pancasila did succeed in bringing the nation towards oneness. What I am saying is that Pancasila did help create a sense of togetherness as well as integration and unity. However, having played upon microcosm-macrocosm conceit, Pancasila was manipulated by Soeharto for his own economic and political interests. This resulted in Pancasila being fragile, and thus in the society being in the throes of political and economic crises. Pancasila's reputation had been severely damaged by Soeharto. His authoritarian rule generated it into, and used it as justification for such practices as egoism, anomie, corruption, monopoly, nepotism, and so on.

I think the short-term solution for the current political and economic crisis facing Indonesia is, what I would call the "intellectual rationalisation" of Pancasila. That is, that Pancasila must be freed from being identical to Soehartoism, namely from Soeharto's authoritarianism, egoism, nepotism, corruption, and collusion. Besides, to be continuously novel, it must constantly stress more the idiom of egalitarianism and social progress. In the long-run, Pancasila -as far as the notion of common identity is concerned- is the closest possible alternative for Indonesia. But it must be hauled by a capable and clean leader with developed intellectual and technical skills. The next leader must be economically literate so that the worsening economic situation can be resolved. He/she must be ideologically conscious so that the relatively stable pattern of Pancasila will not dissolve. Ideological homogeneity must be regularly promoted because Indonesia can not be an Iran-like Islamic state, nor can it be a Soeharto-like authoritarian state. It must be Pancasila state.



## Bibliography

- Alfian. 1996. Pancasila Sebagai Ideologi Dalam Kehidupan Politik. in *Pancasila Sebagai Ideologi Dalam Berbagai Bidang Kehidupan Bermasyarakat, Berbangsa, dan Bernegara*. eds, Oetojo Oesman and Alfian. Jakarta: BP-7 Pusat.
- Anderson, Benedict. R.O'.G. 1990. *Language and Power. Exploring Political Culture in Indonesia*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Atkinson, Jane M. 1988. Religion and the Wana of Sulawesi. in *The Real and Imagined Role of Culture in Development. Case Studies from Indonesia*. ed, Michael R. Dove. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Bellah, Robert. 1970. *Beyond Belief. Essays on Religion in a Post-traditional World*. New York, Evanston and London: Harper & Row.
- 1975. *The Broken Covenant. American Civil Religion in Time of Trial*. New York: A Crossroad Book. The Seabury Press.
- Cribb, Robert and Colin Brown. 1995. *Modern Indonesia: A History Since 1945*. Longman London and New York.
- Dahlan, Alwi and Cris D. Walean. 1996. *Pancasila: A Brief Introduction*. Kadin Indonesia Komite Amerika Serikat (Kikas), Jakarta.
- Durkheim, Emile. 1976. *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*. Second Edition with a new Introduction by Robert Nisbet. Trans, Joseph Ward Swain. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, Ruskin House, museum Street.
- Fatwa, AM. 1995. *Saya Menghayati dan Mengamalkan Pancasila Justru Saya Seorang Muslim. Sebuah Skripsi Pembebasan*. Surabaya: PT Bina Ilmu, jl Tunjungan 53 E-Surabaya 60275
- Feith, Herbert. 1962. *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*. New York: Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
- 1964. "Indonesia", in *Government and Politics of Southeast Asia*. Second Edition, ed, George McTurnan Kahin. New York: Ithaca Cornell University Press.
- Frederick, William H. 1989. *Visions and Heat: The Making of the Indonesian Revolution*. USA: Ohio University Press, Athens.
- Geertz, Clifford 1963. The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New State. in *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for*

- Modernity in Asia and Africa.* ed, Clifford Geertz. London: The Free Press of Glencoe Collier, MacMillan.
- 1965. *The Social History of an Indonesian Town.* USA: The M.I.T Press, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
- 1966. Religion as a Cultural System. in *Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion.* ed, Michal Banton. London: Tavistock Publications.
- 1968. *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia.* New Haven & London, Yale University Press.
- 1969. Religion of Java: Social Conflict and Integration. in *Sociology of Religion, Selected Reading.* ed, Roland Robertson. England: Penguin Books.
- 1973. After the Revolution: The Fate of Nationalism in the New States. in *The Interpretation of Cultures.* New York: Basic Books, Inc, Publishers.
- Gunn, Geoffrey C. 1979. Ideology and the Concept of Government in the Indonesian New Order, *Asian Survey.* August, vol xix, number 8. University of California Press, pp 751-769
- Higgins, Benjamin. 1963. *Indonesia: The Crisis of the Millstones.* Toronto, New York, London: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. Princeton, New Jersey.
- Huntington, Samuel. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies.* New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
- Kahane, Reuven. 1973. *The Problem of Political Legitimacy in an Antagonistic Society. The Indonesian Case.* Vol. I. London: Sage Publication/Beverly Hills.
- Kahin, George MrTurnan. 1952. *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia.* New York: Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
- Karatheodoris, Stephen. 1988. From Social to Cultural Systems and Beyond. Twenty Years After "Religion as a Cultural System". in *Sounding.* Vol. 71 (1)
- Koentjaraningrat. 1985. *Javanese Culture.* Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Oxford University Press.
- Legge, J.D. 1980. *Indonesia.* Third Edition. New Jersey: Prentice Hall of Australia Pty Ltd.
- Levy, Marion J. 1952. *The Structure of Society.* Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press.

- Liddle, R. William. 1985. Soeharto's Indonesia: Personal Rule and Political Institutions. *Pacific Affairs*. Vol. 58, no, 1 Spring. University of British Columbia.
- Moerdiono 1996. Paham Integralistik: Bukan Liberalisme dan Bukan Komunisme. in *Pancasila Sebagai Ideologi Dalam Berbagai Bidang Kehidupan Bermasyarakat, Berbangsa dan Bernegara*. eds, Oetojo Oesman and Alfian. Jakarta: BP-7 Pusat.
- 1996. Pancasila Sebagai Ideologi: Sebuah Renungan Awal. in *Pancasila Sebagai Ideologi Dalam Berbagai Bidang Kehidupan Bermasyarakat, Berbangsa, dan Bernegara*. eds, Oetojo Oesman and Alfian. Jakarta: BP-7 Pusat.
- Morfit, Michael. 1981. Pancasila: The Indonesian State Ideology According to the New Order Government, *Asian Survey*. August, vol xxi, number 8. University of California Press, pp 838-851
- Mubyarto. 1996. Ideologi Pancasila Dalam Kehidupan Ekonomi. in *Pancasila Sebagai Ideologi Dalam Berbagai Bidang Kehidupan Bermasyarakat, Berbangsa, dan Bernegara*. eds, Oetojo Oesman and Alfian. Jakarta: BP-7 Pusat.
- Niebuhr, Reinhold. 1945. *Children of Light and Children of Darkness*. Londond: Nisbet & Co, Ltd, zz. Berner Street, WI.
- Oesman, Oetojo and Alfian. 1996. Pancasila Sebagai Ideologi Dalam Kehidupan Bermasyarakat, Berbangsa dan Bernegara. in *Pancasila Sebagai Ideologi Dalam Berbagai Bidang Kehidupan Bermasyarakat, Berbangsa dan Bernegara*. eds, Oetojo Oesman and Alfian. Jakarta: BP-7 Pusat.
- Parsons, Talcott and Edward Shils. 1951. Values, Motives, and Social Systems of Action. in *Toward a Geberal Theory of Action*. eds, Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils. New York: Harper & Row, publisher.
- 1973. Cultural and Social System Revisited. in *The Idea of Culture in the Social Sciences*. eds, L Schneider and C.M. Bonjeau. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- 1968. *The Structure of Social Action*, with a new Introduction. New York, London: A Free Press Paperback. The MacMillan Company.
- 1966. *Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs.

loopholes : selu



- 1982. *On Institutions and Social Evolution: Selected Writings*, edited with an introduction by Leon H. Mayhew. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Peacock, James L. 1976. Expressive Symbolism, in *Explorations in General Theory of Social Science*, eds Jan J. Loubser, et.al. Vol One. New York & London: Macmillan Publications Co., Inc, pp 264-276
- Penner, H.H. 1981. Garuda. in *The Perennial Dictionary of World Religions*. ed, Keith Crim. San Fransisco: Harper & Row, publishers.
- Poespowardojo, Soerjanto. 1996. Pancasila Sebagai Ideologi Ditinjau Dari Segi Pandangan Hidup Bersama. in *Pancasila Sebagai Ideologi Dalam Berbagai Bidang Kehidupan Bermasyarakat, Berbangsa dan Bernegara*. eds, Oetojo Oesman and Alfian. Jakarta: BP-7 Pusat.
- Ramage, Douglas E. 1995. *Politics in Indonesia. Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance*. Routledge and New York.
- Ricklefs, M.C. 1993. *A History of Modern Indonesia Since C. 1300*. Second Edition. London: The MacMillan Press.
- Sastrapratedja, M. 1996. Pancasila Sebagai Ideologi Dalam Kehidupan Budaya. in *Pancasila Sebagai Ideologi Dalam Berbagai Kehidupan Bermasyarakat, Berbangsa dan Bernegara*. eds, Oetojo Oesman and Alfian. Jakarta: BP-7 Pusat.
- Sievers, Allen M. 1974. *The Mystical World of Indonesia. Culture and Economic Development in Conflict*. The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore & London.
- Soedjatmoko. 1965. Introduction, in *An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography*, eds, Soedjatmoko, et.al. New York: Ithaca, Cornell University Press, pp xi-xxvi
- Swasono, Sri Edi. 1996. Demokrasi Ekonomi: Keterkaitan Usaha Partisipatif vs Konsentrasi Ekonomi. in *Pancasila Sebagai Ideologi Dalam Berbagai Bidang Kehidupan Bermasyarakat, Berbangsa, dan Bernegara*. eds, Oetojo Oesman and Alfian. Jakarta: BP-7 Pusat.
- Tjokroamidjojo, Bintoro. 1996. Pancasila Sebagai Ideologi Birokrasi/Aparatur Pemerintah. in *Pancasila Sebagai Ideologi Dalam Berbagai Bidang Kehidupan Bermasyarakat, Berbangsa dan Bernegara*. eds, Oetojo Oesman and Alfian. Jakarta: BP-7 Pusat.
- Van Der Kroef, J.M. 1954. *Indonesia in the Modern World*. Part I. Bandung: Masa Baru.

Wahid, Abdurrahman. 1996. Pancasila Sebagai Ideologi Dalam Kaitannya Dengan Kehidupan Beragama dan Berkepercayaan Terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa. in *Pancasila Sebagai Ideologi Dalam Berbagai Bidang Kehidupan Bermasyarakat, Berbangsa dan Bernegara*. eds, Oetojo Oesman and Alfian. Jakarta: BP-7 Pusat.

Warner, W. Lloyd. 1959. *The Living and the Dead: A Study of the Symbolic Life of Americans*. New Haven, Conn, Yale University Press.

Wertheim, W.F. 1959. *Indonesian Society in Transition. A Study of Social Change*. Second Revised Edition. The Hague and Bandung: W. Van Hoeve Ltd.

Williams, Robin M., Jr., 1960. *American Society: A Sociological Interpretation*. Second Edition, Revised. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Zakaria, Kosky, ed. 1995/1996. *Indonesia 1996: An Official Handbook*. Perum Percetakan Negara RI, Jakarta.

#### Other Reference

Wibisono, Christianto. 1998 *Asean 10 dan Pancasila*. Suara Pembaruan Online, 04/17/98.